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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Brian Lee Draper appeals from his convictions and sentences for first 
degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. 
Statement Of The Facts 
On about August 31, 2006, eighteen-year-old Joe Lucero received a 
phone call from a friend, Torey Adamcik, asking if Lucero would go with him and 
Brian Draper to buy some knives for a knife collection Adamcik was starting 
because he needed somebody eighteen years old to buy the knives. (Tr., vol. 2, 
p.1626, L.11 - p.1630, L.20; p.1643, Ls.9-18; p.1635, Ls.7-11.) Lucero agreed to 
buy the knives, and Adamcik and Draper, who Lucero had played soccer with, 
drove to Lucero's home, and the three drove together in Adamcik's car to Mad 
Mike's Pawn Shop, stopping on the way at an ATM so Draper could withdraw 
some money from his bank account. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1631, L.8 - p.1633, L.22; 
p.1643, Ls.12-18.) Draper gave Lucero $45 to buy the knives.1 (Tr., vol. 2, 
. p.1634, Ls.5-23.) The three went inside the pawn shop where Adamcik pointed 
out one knife and Draper selected three other knives for Lucero to buy. (Tr., vol. 
2, p.1634, L.24 - p.1636, L.16.) After about thirty minutes in the pawn shop, 
Lucero bought the four knives (St. Exs. 78, 79, 80, 83) for about $40. (Tr., vol. 2, 
p.1636, LA c p.1639, L.11.) The three left the pawn shop and Lucero handed the 
knives to either Adamcik or Draper, and asked to be driven home. (Tr., vol. 2, . 
1 Lucero recalled that Adamcik gave Draper $5 "to pitch in." (Tr., vol. 2, p.1645, 
L.25 - p.1646, L.1.) 
1 
p.1639, Ls.16-21.) During the drive back to Lucero's home, Lucero asked 
Adamcik and Draper, "You guys aren't going to stab anybody, are you?" and they 
both replied, "No." (Tr., vol. 2, p.1639, L.22 - p.1640, L.10.) 
A few weeks later, sixteen-year-old Cassie Jo Stoddart agreed to house-
sit and take care of three cats and two dogs for Allison Contrerras over the 
weekend of September 22, 2006, at the Contrerras's Pocatello residence at 
11372 Whispering Cliffs while the Contrerras family spent the weekend in 
Wyoming.2 (Tr., vol. 1, p.742, Ls.6-15; p.752, Ls.8-20; p.755, L.12 - p.757, L.14.) 
The Contrerrases left their home at about 1 :00 or 2:00 p.m. on Friday, 
September 22. (Tr., vol. 1, p.758, L.20 - p.759, L.3.) 
Anna Stoddart, Cassie's mother, knew Cassie was going to house sit for 
the Contrerrases that weekend, and Cassie had done so several times before. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.829, L.9 - p.830, L.22.) That Friday, Anna picked up Cassie and 
Matt Beckham (Cassie's boyfriend) after high school ended at 3:30, and drove 
them back to the Stoddart residence where Cassie and Matt watched television 
and "hung out." (Tr., veil. 1, p. 832, Ls.2-6; p.887, L.24 - p.888, L.25.) At about 
5:30 that aftemoon, Anna drove Cassie and Matt to the Contrerras home and 
dropped them off. (Tr., vol. 1, p.831, L.16 - p.832, L.15; p.889, Ls.1-16.) Anna 
called Cassie at about 7:30 that evening and Cassie told her she and Matt were 
watching a movie. (Tr., vol. 1, p.833, L.17 - p.834, L.12.) Anna told Cassie to 
call her first thing in the moming, and told her she loved her and would talk to her 
in the moming. (Tr., vol. 1, p.834, Ls.18-22.) 
2 Allison Contrerras's husband, Frank, is a cousin of Cassie's mother, Anna 
Stoddart. (Tr., vol. 1, p.753, L.20 - p.754, L.1.) 
2 
I 
Cassie had invited Adamcik and Draper, friends from high school who had 
occasionally visited Cassie at her home, to go to the Whispering Cliffs residence 
that Friday evening.3 (Tr., vol. 1, p.854, L.24 - p.856, L.13; p.892, L.24 - p.893, 
L.3.) Adamcik and Draper arrived at the house in Adamcik's red car at about 
6:30 or 7:00 p.m. (Tr., vol. 1, p.889, Ls.1-16; p.891, L.6 - p.892, L.1.) Matt 
testified that after Adamcik and Draper came into the house they went through 
the entire house looking in all the rooms while Cassie and Matt followed them. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.893, Ls.6-23.) The four then went upstairs and watched a movie --
"Kill Bill Volume 11." (Tr., vol. 1, p.893, L.24 - p.894, L.6.) During the movie, 
Draper and Cassie went downstairs, followed by Matt ten to fifteen minutes later, 
then Adamcik a couple minutes thereafter. (Tr., vol. 1, p.895, Ls.1-19; p.897, 
Ls.1-5.) The four played on a Universal Gym for about five to ten minutes, then 
went back upstairs to continue watching the movie. (Tr., vol. 1, p.896, L.1 -
p.897, L.23.) Before the movie finished, Draper said he had to be home by 9:00, 
and Adamcik and Draper asked Matt if he was going to spend the night at the 
house with Cassie. (Tr., vol. 1, p.897, L.24 - p.898, L.15.) Somewhere around 
9:30 p.m., Adamcik and Draper left the residence together. (Id.) After Adamcik 
and Draper left, Matt called his mother to ask if he could spend the night at the 
Whispering Cliffs residence, and she told him he could not. (Tr., vol. 1, p.899, 
Ls.9-20; p.949, L.22 - p.950, L.9.) Matt then called Adamcik to let him know he 
3 Matt had known Draper since the seventh grade, and knew Adamcik from 
school the year before-- both were Matt's friends. (Tr., vol. 1, p.884, L.22 -
p.886, L.9.) 
3 
wasn't going to be able to stay at the Whispering Cliffs residence that night, and 
had to go home instead. (Tr., vol. 1, p.899, L.21 - p.900, L.8.) 
Cassie and Matt sat on the couch watching television, and about twenty or 
thirty minutes after Adamcik and Draper left, all the power in the house went off. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.900, L.9 - p.901, L.13.) Matt turned on electrical switches but 
nothing worked. (Id.) As Cassie and Matt sat in the living room waiting for 
something to happen, one hallway light came on -- but no other switches worked. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.901, L.16 - p.902, L.20.) While still sitting in the living room without 
the power on, one of the dogs began "freaking out," growling as it repeatedly ran 
back and forth between the hallway and the living room. (Tr., vol. 1, p.904, L.22 -
p.905, 22.) Matt called his mother at about 10:30 p.m., and again asked her if he 
could spend the night because he and Cassie were "a little freaked out" about the 
power going out. (Tr., vol. 1, p.958, L.22 - p.959, L.10; p.964, Ls.7-20.) She 
refused Matt's request, but upon suggesting that Cassie could come back to their 
horne, she heard Cassie in the background say, "no, I have to let the animals out 
real early; I'm just going to stay." (Tr., vol. 1, p.964, L.21 - p.965, L.10.) When 
the phone call with his mother ended, Matt called Adamcik once more to tell him 
he would not be able to spend the night. (Tr., vol. 1, p.903, L.16 - p.904, L.2.) 
During that call, Matt noticed Adamcik was whispering, and when he asked him 
why, Adamcik told him he was in a movie. (Tr., vol. 1, p.904, Ls.3-12.) 
Sherri Beckham arrived with her husband at the Whispering Cliffs 
residence to pick up Matt at about 11 :00 or 11 :30,and Matt gave Cassie a hug 
and a kiss and told her he would call her when he got home -- and Matt was 
4 
. ) 
! 
i 
r 
driven home. (Tr., vol. 1, p.906, Ls.1-10; p.952, L.22 - p.953, L.22.) After 
arriving home, Matt tried to call Cassie at 12:15 a.m., but she did not answer; he 
also tried to call her the next moming ten to fifteen times, without success. (Tr., 
vol. 1, p.906, L.15 - p.907, L.1S.) On Saturday evening, September 23rd, Matt 
spent the night at Adamcik's house, along with Adamcik's family and two of 
Adamcik's cousins. (Tr., vol. 1, p.933, Ls.5-22.) During that time, concemed 
because Cassie was not answering her phone, Matt asked Adamcik to drive him 
to the Whispering Cliffs residence to check on Cassie, but Adamcik said he did 
not have enough gas to do that. (Tr., vol. 1, p.934, Ls.4-13.) Anna Stoddart 
unsuccessfully attempted to call Cassie on Saturday moming and evening and 
on Sunday moming and did not receive any responses to the telephone 
messages she left on Cassie's phone. (Tr., vol. 1, p.S35, L.12 - p.S3S, L.7.) 
At about 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, September 24,2006, the Contrerras family 
arrived back at their Whispering Cliffs home after their Wyoming trip. (T r., vol. 1, 
p.760, Ls.2-S.) When they opened the garage door, Allison Contrerras noticed 
the doors "were all open and/or off the hook," and "[t]here was broken glass and 
stuff at the foot of [the] stairs ... ," (Tr., vol. 1, p.761, Ls.S-16.) Shortly after 
Allison's husband went upstairs, he came running back down screaming, "[c]all 
911 somebody is dead on our floor." (Tr., vol. 1, p.760, L.25 - p,761, L.2.) 
Allison ran upstairs, called 911, and ran into the living room where she saw 
Cassie's body laying on the floor in front of the television with blood behind her 
head and left leg, and her left hand pinky almost severed. (Tr., vol. 1, p.761, 
Ls.5-7; p.763, L.21 - p.764, L.11.) The 911 dispatcher asked Allison to conduct 
5 
CPR on Cassie, but it was obvious to Allison that CPR would not work. (Tr., vol. 
1, p.768, L.23 - p.769, L.2.) The dispatcher asked Allison to touch Cassie's 
body, and after finding that Cassie's body was cold, Allison concluded Cassie 
was dead. (Tr., vol. 1, p.768, L.24 - p.769, L.16.) Allison went outside onto the 
balcony, and told everyone to stay outside, when she noticed Anna Stoddart and 
Victor Price (Cassie's stepfather) driving into the driveway. (Tr., vol. 1, p.769, 
Ls.19-23; p.770, LS.6-12.) Frank Contrerras met them as they pulled into the 
driveway and informed them Cassie was dead.4 (Tr., vol. 1, p.839, Ls.11-16.) 
About ten minutes later, at 1 :55 p.m., Detective Karen Hatch of the 
Bannock County Sheriff's Office arrived at the Whispering Cliffs residence and 
went inside with paramedics who confirmed Cassie was dead. (Tr., vol. 1, p.771, 
Ls.5-14; p.809, L.18 - p.812, L.3; p.814, Ls.12-22; p.816, Ls.2-15.) Detective 
Hatch maintained control of the crime scene until other detectives arrived. (Tr., 
vol. 1, p.818, L.22 - 819, L.17.) Detective Andy Thomas of the Bannock County 
Sheriff's Office was dispatched to the Whispering Cliffs residence at about 2:30 
p.m. and went into the house with Lt. Vollmer to check on the pets inside the 
house, and after finding them in a bedroom, the officers left the house. (Tr., vol. 
1, p.968, Ls.3-7; p.975, L.19 - p.976, L.21; p.980, Ls.7-22; p.982, Ls.1-7.) One 
hour to ninety minutes later, Detective Thomas and crime scene investigators re-
entered the house and Detective Thomas observed that Cassie's body had 
obvious stab wounds to her chest and abdomen, and her left hand pinky was 
4 Anna Stoddart called Matt Beckham that aftemoon and told him Cassie was 
dead. (Tr., vol. 1, p.907, L.23 - p.908, L.13.) 
6 
I 
almost severed. (Tr., vol. 1, p.982, L.11 - p.984, L.2.) Law enforcement began 
investigating the murder, which led them to Adamcik and Draper. 
Draper's First Interview -- 9/25/06 
Just after midnight on Monday, September 25, 2006, Detective Thomas 
went with Lt. John Ganske of the Idaho State Police to Draper's house and, after 
being let into the house by Draper's mother, told Draper they were there to 
investigate Cassie's death and the events surrounding it.5 (Tr., vol. 1, p.986, 
L.24 - p.991, L.6.) After initially crying, Draper explained that he and Adamcik 
went to visit Matt and Cassie at the Whispering Cliffs residence at about 8:15 or 
8:30 p.m. on September 22nd, and Cassie told him the day before that they might 
have a party that evening. (Tr., vol. 1, p.991, L.7 - p.994, LA.) According to 
Draper, he decided to leave after realizing there wasn't going to be a party, so he 
and Adamcik left the residence about 9:30 p.m. (Tr., vol. 1, p.994, Ls.5-19.) 
Draper told the detectives that he and Adamcik drove to the Carmike Cinemas 
but were too late to see their intended movie, "Click," so they watched "Pulse" 
instead. (Tr., vol. 1, p.994, L.20 - p.995, L.9.) When asked to explain what Pulse 
was about, Draper avoided answering the question and his mother told him to tell 
the officers what the movie was about -- however, he was unable to do so. (Tr., 
p.995, L.12 - p.997, LA.) Draper wrote out a statement for the detectives, 
describing what transpired before, during, and after he and Adamcik visited Matt 
5 Draper's first interview was not recorded because neither Detective Thomas 
nor Lt. Ganske had recording devices with them, and, as Detective Thomas 
explained, Draper was one of a large group of people of interest in the 
investigation. (Tr., vol. 1, p.998, L.16 - p.999, L.7.) 
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and Cassie at the Whispering Cliffs residence on Friday, September 22, 2006. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.999, L.16 - p.1000, L.19; see St. Ex. 8.) 
Draper's Second Interview -- 9/26/06 
On Tuesday evening, September 26, 2006, Detective Thomas and Lt. 
Ganske interviewed Draper in an interview room at the Pocatello Police 
Department. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1 001, L.1 - p.1002, L.23.) Draper's parents "showed 
up'" at the police department for the interview, but did not go into the interview 
room with Draper and the detectives. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1001, L.21 - p.1002, L.23.) 
At the beginning of the videotaped interview, Draper was advised he was not 
under arrest, he was given his Miranda rights, and was told he did not have to 
talk to the detectives. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1002, Ls.15-23; St. Ex. 9A, 8:06-8:52.) 
During the second interview, Draper admitted he and Adamcik had looked 
through every room in the Whispering Cliffs home upon their arrival on Friday 
evening, but said they had been escorted by Matt. (St. Ex. 9A, 18:30 - 18:54.) 
Draper told the detectives he liked horror movies, his favorite movie was 
"Halloween," and, after being told about a script by Adamcik, he related an idea 
he had for his own slasher movie. (St. Ex. 9A, 20:00 - 21:18,1:17:25 - 1:20:15.) 
Draper also revealed that he had had a crush on Cassie. (St. Ex. 9A, 1 :22:30-
1 :23:30.) 
During the first phase of Draper's second interview, he maintained he and 
Adamcik had gone to the movies and seen "Pulse," but he still could not provide 
details about the movie, or describe which specific theatre inside the Carmike 
Cinemas they watched it in. (St. Ex. 9A, 33:25 - 53:57.) Draper said he met and 
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talked to an attractive young girl named Heather inside the theatre, and 
described her as having brown hair and being pretty short. (St. Ex. 9A, 45:05 -
46:50.) 
About 55 minutes into the interview, one of the detectives told Draper that 
they did not believe he had gone to the theatre. (St. Ex. 9A, 54:35 - 55:14.) 
. Draper then changed his story, explaining he and Adamcik had burglarized 
("went through") cars, and had called Matt to join them, but Matt said his mother 
was going to pick him up, so he could not go with them. (St. Ex. 9A, 56:00 -
56:48, 1:2:45 - 1:4:30.) Draper said he hid the fact he and Adamcik had been 
going through cars because a friend told him such a crime carried a ten-year 
prison penalty. (St. Ex. 9A, 58:10 - 58:31.) According to Draper, after visiting 
Matt and Cassie on Friday evening, he and Adamcik went through cars in the 
Whisperin9 Cliffs neighborhood then drove to Adamcik's house and went through 
more cars in that area before returning to the Adamcik house at about 11 :30 p.m. 
to spend the night. (St. Ex. 9A, 1 :8:20 - 1 :9:50.) Draper denied he and Adamcik 
had snuck back into the Whispering Cliffs residence after visiting Matt and 
Cassie, and denied he had anything to do with Cassie's murder. (St. Ex. 9A, 
1:8:25 -1:8:37,1:16:30 - 1:16:57,1:27:45 - 1:28:00; St. Ex. 98, 35:50 - 37:07.) 
When one of the detectives told Draper his "car-burglary" story was not working, 
Draper insisted it was true. (St. Ex. 98, 26:00 - 30:20.) At the end of the 
interview, Draper went home with his parents. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1021, Ls.22-25.) 
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Evidence Obtained From Draper's Bedroom 
After monitoring Draper's second interview, Detective ROller Schei went to 
Draper's residence with another detective to look for gloves and other items 
related to Cassie's murder. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1257, L.14 - p.1258, L.4; p.1261, L.17 -
p.1263, L.25.) Draper's parents and Draper all consented for the detectives to go 
into Draper's bedroom and search for those items. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1264, Ls.4-15.) 
The detectives found a knife sheath (St. Ex. 20) under Draper's bed, which 
Draper said belonged to a friend named Andrew who had brought it to his house 
and left it; Draper did not know where the knife for the sheath was, but believed 
Andrew had it. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1270, L.17 - p.1271, L.25; p.1272, L.19 - p.1273. 
L.21.) 
Draper's Third Interview -- 9/27106 
Draper was interviewed again on Wednesday, September 27, 2006, by 
Detective Thomas and Detective Alex Hamilton, in an interview room at the 
Bannock County Sheriffs Office at about 2:30 p.m. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1022, L.7 -
p.1023, L.18.) That interview was videotaped. (St. Ex. 16.) Draper was read his 
Miranda rights and agreed to talk to the detectives without a lawyer. (Tr., vol. 1, 
p.1032, Ls.7-12.) Draper's parents were with him in the interview room (Tr., vol. 
1, p.1031, L.21 - p.1032, L.6), and Draper signed a Miranda rights waiver form 
(St. Ex. 15) before the interview began. The gist of Draper's comments to the 
detectives follows: 
(1) When Draper and Adamcik went to visit Cassie and Matt at 
the Whispering Cliffs residence on Friday evening, they unlocked a 
basement door so they could later re-enter the home and scare 
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Cassie and Matt. (St. Ex. 16, 14:39:45 - 40:06,14:52:50 - 53:18, 
15:26:20 - 27:55.) 
(2) After visiting Cassie and Matt, Draper and Adamcik left the 
residence, parked down the street, and re-entered the residence 
through the unlocked basement door. (St. Ex. 16, 14:39:45 - 40:00, 
15:26:20 - 27:55, 15:28:55 - 29:10.) 
(3) Draper and Adamcik turned the power to the lights off in the 
house from the electrical panel in the basement and Draper broke 
two ashtrays on the stairway -- in order to scare Cassie and Matt. 
(St. Ex. 16, 14:40:00-06, 14:53:10-31.) 
(4) After calling Matt by phone while downstairs, Matt informed 
them that he was going to be leaving soon. (St. Ex. 16, 14:40:06-
15, 14:50:54 - 51:13.) Matt was picked up by his mother about 
11:00 p.m. (St. Ex. 16, 14:51:15-28.) 
(5) Soon after Matt left the residence, Draper and Adamcik --
wearing horror-movie type masks, black shirts and jeans, and each 
carrying a knife -- went upstairs. (St. Ex. 16, 14:54:30-50, 
14:59:00-21, 15:08:52 - 09:20, 15:28:20-52.) Draper shut a door 
upstairs in an attempt to scare Cassie. (St. Ex. 16, 14:59:30-59, 
15:35: 15-20.) 
(6) Draper and Adamcik waited about two minutes in an upstairs 
room, expecting Cassie to enter the room to investigate the door 
being shut, and then Adamcik stepped in front of Draper and 
walked into the living room where Cassie was. (St. Ex. 16, 
15:46:35-50.) Cassie said "who's that?" and "I'll kick your ass," and 
as she walked from the couch toward Adamcik, he stabbed her and 
she screamed. (St. Ex. 16, 15:00:00 - 02:45,15:46:50 - 48:30.) 
(7) Draper at first thought Adamcik and Cassie were playing a 
joke on him and trying to scare him, but when Adamcik shined his 
flashlight on Cassie, it did not look like her wounds were fake at all. 
(St. Ex. 16, 14:40:50 - 41 :03, 15:04:05-32, 15:48:30 - 51 :23.) 
(8) Draper watched as Adamcik stabbed Cassie more and 
wondered what Adamcik was doing because it was supposed to be 
a joke. (8t. Ex. 16, 15:51:23-30.) 
(9) Adamcik did all the stabbing that was done to Cassie, all 
with his black serrated knife, which Draper sketched for the 
detectives. (St. Ex. 16, 15:03:55 - 04:05,15:10:45 - 11:54; St. Ex. 
17.) 
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(10) Draper, who carried a very curved knife with him that 
evening (see St. Ex. 17), did not stab Cassie and did not touch her 
(St. Ex. 16, 15:03:43-55, 15:10:50-55). 
(11) Draper and Adamcik left the Whispering Cliffs residence and 
later attempted to get rid of all the items and clothing used in 
Cassie's murder by driving to a rural area, placing the items in a 
plastic bag, and trying to bum them. (St. Ex. 16, 15:55:20 -
16:06:13.) 
(12) Earlier on the day of Draper's third interview, Draper talked 
in person with Adamcik, who wamed Draper that if he told 
authorities the truth, he would kill him. (St. Ex. 16, 14:44:10-22.) 
(13) Draper agreed to show the detectives where he and 
Adamcik had attempted to bum (or bury) the items and clothing 
used in Cassie's murder. (St. Ex. 16, 15:51:30-48.) 
The Black Rock Canyon Evidence 
After Draper's September 27,2006 (third) interview, he went with several 
detectives and his father to the Black Rock Canyon area and directed the 
detectives to the spot he and Adamcik buried the items used in Cassie's murder. 
(Tr., vol. 1, p.1049, L9 - p.1050, L5;Tr., vol. 2, p.1394, Ls.5-14, p.1395, Ls.2-7.) 
Lt. Mike Brennan dug out that area (Tr., vol. 2, p.1393, Ls.3-6; p.1395, L18 -
p.1396, L 11) which resulted in finding many items, including in part: 
(a) stick matches found outside the hole (Tr., vol. 2, p.1420, L2 
. - p.1422, L20; St. Ex. 72); 
(b) a pair of black boots (Tr., vol. 2, p.1423, U5 - p.1425, L.7; 
St. Ex. 73); 
(c) a pair of blue rubber gloves (Tr., vol. 2, p.1425, L.20 -
p.1427, L.8; St. Ex. 74); 
(d) a pair of fingerless gloves with the brand of Athletics Works 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1427, L.20 - p.1429, L.16; p.1804, L.7 - p.1805, 
L.3; St. Ex. 75); 
(e) a brown plastic hydrogen peroxide bottle that was melted 
severely (Tr., vol. 2, p.1430, L.1 - p.1431, L.2; St. Ex. 76); 
(f) a multi-colored mask -- white, pink and black -- partially 
melted (Tr., vol. 2, p.1431, L.14 - p.1432, L.24; st. Ex. 77); 
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(g) a large dagger-type knife with a sheath (Tr., vol. 2, p.1433, 
L.12 - p.1434, L.24; St. Ex. 78); 
(h) a silver and black-handled knife with a signature of "Sloan" . 
written on the inside, referred to as the "Sloan knife" (Tr., vol. 
2, p. 1435, L.12 - p.1436, L.22; St. Ex. 79); 
(i) a small dagger type knife with a sheath (Tr., vol. 2, p.1437, 
L.16 - p.1439, L.2; St. Ex. 80); 
G) a homemade Sony videotape (Tr., vol. 2, p.1440, L.13 -
p.1441, L.13; p.1501, L.7 - p.1508, L.6; St. Ex. 81); 
(k) stick matches found inside the hole (Tr., vol. 2, p.1444, L.21 
- p.1445, L.25; St. Ex. 82); 
(I) a black-handled folding knife with large serrations on the 
backside (Tr., vol. 2, p.1446, L.11 - p.1448, L.6; st. Ex. 83); 
(m) a partly bumed piece of notebook paper with writing in pencil 
on it (Tr., vol. 2, p.1448, L.25 - p.1450, L.10; St. Ex. 84); 
(n) a red and white mask (Tr., vol. 2, p.1451, L.2 - p.1452, L.22; 
St. Ex. 85); 
(0) a single black glove (Tr., vol. 2, p.1453, L.14 - p.1454, L.15; 
St. Ex. 86); 
(p) a pair of black "Puma" brand gloves, partially burned (Tr., 
vol. 2, p.1455, Ls.2-24; St. Ex. 87); 
(q) a blue plastic garbage bag (Tr., vol. 2, p.1456, L.11 ~ p.1457, 
L.16; St. Ex. 88); 
(r) a black, long-sleeved, "Hagar" [sic] dress shirt, partially 
burned (Tr., vol. 2, p.1457, L.21 - p.1459, L.20; St. Ex. 89); 
(s) a Calvin Klein black dress shirt (Tr., vol. 2, p.1460, L.13 -
p.1461, L.22; St. Ex. 90); 
(t) a white and gray sock (Tr., vol. 2, p.1462, L.7 - p.i463, L.24; 
St. Ex. 91); 
(u) a small piece of black rope or cord (Tr., vol. 2, p.1464, L.12-
p.1465, L.22; st. Ex. 92); 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.1398, L.21 - p.1399, L.7.) 
DNA testing on several of the Black Rock Canyon items revealed: (a) the 
serrated folding knife (St. Ex. 83) had DNA matching Cassie's DNA; (b) the red 
and white mask (St. Ex. 85) had a partial DNA profile matching Adamcik's DNA 
profile; (c) the "Puma" gloves (St. Ex. 87) contained a blood stain matching 
Cassie's DNA; and (d) fabric from the Calvin Klein shirt (St. Ex. 90) had DNA on 
its cuff matching Cassie's DNA (Tr., vol. 2, p.1793, LA - p.1794, L.10; p.1809, 
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L.1 - p.1810, L.5; p.1811, L.6 - p.1812, L.6; p.1822, Ls.1-20; p.1829, Ls.2-3, 19-
24; p.1837, L.15 - p.1839, L.3; p.1839, L.21 - p.1840, L.20.) 
Detective Mike Ballard testified that he believed Adamcik was the one who 
wrote an apparent script that was on a partially burned piece of notebook paper 
(St. Ex. 84) found at Black Rock Canyon.6 (Tr., vol. 2, p.1473, L.7 - p.1474, 
L.17.) On that piece of paper, the following partial phrases and letters appear, 
from top to bottom: 
is home alone stop 
out the house. 
runs into Torey 
We murder Cassie 
e is home alone 
... ouse. Brian kills h 
his (unclear) on the back porch 
house ... Brian chases her th 
her (unclear) + (unclear) ... kill her. 
e;. If Cassie + Matt come ho . 
A noise (unclear) ... kill Matt + (unclear) 
(St. Ex. 84.) 
Draper's Fourth Interview -- 9/28/06 
Draper was arrested on the night of September 27, 2006, after he had 
taken the detectives to the Black Rock Canyon area. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1052, L.15 -
p.1053, L.4.) Shortly after noon on Thursday, September 28, 2006, Draper was 
interviewed for a fourth time at the Bannock County Sheriffs Office by Detective 
Thomas and Lt. Ganske, without Draper's parents being present because the 
officers had been unable to contact them that day before the interview. (Tr., vol. 
6 The detective based his belief upon having seen a videotape of Adamcik and 
D'raper at Pocatello High School "describing a murder that they were going to 
commit." (Tr., vol. 2, p.1473, L.23 - p.1474, L.17; see St. Ex. 94, pp.7-13.) 
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1, p.1050, L.16 - p.1 052, L.11; St. Ex. 19, 12:27:20-31, 12:30:05-13.) At the start 
of the videotaped interview, Draper was given his Miranda rights and signed a 
waiver form (St. Ex. 18), and was advised he did not have to answer any 
questions and he could have his parents present. (St. Ex. 19, 12:29:05 -
12:30:35.) 
Draper reiterated that Adamcik was· the only one who stabbed Cassie. 
(St. Ex. 19, 12:33:17-47, 12:41:32-57.) However, after one of the detectives 
asked Draper whether he stabbed Cassie in order to keep Adamcik from turning 
on him, Draper nodded affirmatively. (St. Ex. 19, 12:43:40 - 12:44:01.) Draper 
said that, although he didn't want to, he stabbed Cassie four times, first saying he 
stabbed her in the leg. (St. Ex. 19, 12:44:02-21.) When one of the detectives 
asked him ''where else?" Draper used his arm to indicate the chest area. (St. Ex. 
19, 12:44:21-27.) Draper said he stabbed Cassie after Adamcik came over to 
make sure she was dead and told Draper, "you need to stab her, you need to 
stab her." (St. Ex. 19, 12:45:29-38.) Draper told the detectives that, at that point, 
he was thinking he could not do it, but Adamcik told him he needed to stab 
. . 
Cassie and to just do it quickly. (St. Ex. 19, 12:45:45-52.) Draper said he then 
stabbed Cassie in one leg and Adamcik told him, "its not gonna work, she has to 
die." (St. Ex. 19, 12:45:45-52.) A detective told Draper that Adamcik had already 
killed Cassie, and Draper said, "yeah he just kept saying that I had, you have to 
stab her -- you have to stab her." (St. Ex. 19, 12:46:00-12.) The interview ended 
shortly thereafter when Draper asked if he could see his parents. (St. Ex. 19, 
12:46:12-18.) 
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The Homemade Video 
The homemade video (St. Ex. 81) found buried at Black Rock Canyon was 
cleaned, straightened, and although copied onto DVD format (St. Ex. 97), the 
original VHS tape (St. Ex. 81) was played for the jury. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1481, L.8 -
p.1484, L.25; p.1528, L.25 - p.1531, L.13; p.1546, L.10 - p.1548, L.7.) After a 
sheriff's office transcriber prepared a transcript of that videotape, Detective 
Hamilton listened to the video with headphones and "turned up the volume really 
loud" and made a corrected version of the transcript (St. Ex. 94)7 which was 
admitted into evidence. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1508, L.19 - p.1521, L.22.) A summary of 
the most relevant parts of that video, as reflected by the corrected transcript in 
chronological sequence, is as follows: 
a. September 21,2006, 08:05:24 p.m. 
[Transcriber's note: "It's dark and subjects are in vehicle, driving."] 
Brian Draper: We're going for a high death count. 
Torey Adamcik: We're not going not [sic] to get caught Brian. If 
we're going for guns we're just gonna end it. We're just gonna grab 
the guns and get out of there and kill everybody and leave. 
Torey Adamcik: For all you F.B.I. agents watching this. 
Torey Adamcik: You weren't quick enough. 
7 State's Exhibits 94 A through L are separate copies of the transcription of the 
videotape furnished for each juror during trial. The state will simply refer to the 
transcription as State's Exhibit 94. 
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(St. Ex. 94, p.2.) Brian Draper said they were on their way to D.D.'s house, and 
"if she's home alone, splat! She is dead." (Id.) 
b. September 21,2006,08:08:15 p.m. 
[Transcriber's note: "Subjects are in vehicle."] 
Brian Draper: We're at the [D.D.'s last name] house. It's clear out 
there in the pasture. We've already snooped around her house a 
couple of times. Uh, she's not at home so we're gonna go to that 
church over there and we're gonna call a girl and a guy named 
Cassie and Matt. They're our our [sic] friends but we have to make 
sacrifices. So um I feel tonight it is the night and I feel really weird 
... and stuff. I feel like I want to kill somebody. Uh, I know that's 
not normal but what the hell. 
Torey Adamcik: I feel we need to break away from normal life. 
(St. Ex. 94, pp.2-3.) 
c. September 21, 2006, 08:15:41 p.m. 
Brian Draper: And we're going to go over to Cassie and Matt's 
house. If they're home alone, we're gonna [.] 
Torey Adamcik: It's Cassie's house. Matt is there. 
Brian Draper: Matt is there. Sorry. We're gonna knock on the 
door. We'll see who is there. We'll, we'll see, we'll see see [sic] if 
their parents are home or not. If they're home alone we will leave 
our way and then we will come back in about ten minutes. We'll 
sneak in through the door cause chances are they're probably in 
Cassie's room. So we'll sneak in the front door, we'll make a noise 
outside. 
Torey Adamcik: And Matt will come out to investigate. 
Brian Draper: We'll kill him. And we'll scare the shit out of Cassie. 
Okay? 
Torey Adamcik: Sounds like fun. 
(St. Ex. 94, pA.) 
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d. September 21 , 2006, 08:36:46 p.m. 
[Transcriber's note: "Individuals are in vehicle. It's raining."] 
Brian Draper: We found our victim and sad as it may be she's our 
friend but you know what we all have to make sacrifices. Our first 
victim is going to be Cassie Stoddart and her friends. 
Brian Draper: We'll let you ... (laughs). We'll find out if she has 
friends over, if she's going to be alone in a big dark house out in the 
middle of nowhere. (laughs) How perfect can you get? I, I mean 
like holy shit dude. 
Torey Adamcik: I'm homy just thinking about it. 
Brian Draper: Hell Yeah [sic]. So we're gonna fucking kill her and 
her friends and we're gonna keep moving on. I heard some news 
about [K.]. She's gonna be home alone from six to seven so we 
might kill her and drive over to Cassie's thing and scare the shit out 
of them and kill them one by fucking one. Hell yeah. 
Torey Adamcik: Why one by one? Why can't it be a 
slaughterhouse? 
(St. Ex. 94, ppA-5.) The conversation continues with, among other comments, 
Draper telling Adamcik they will go down in history like Ted Bundy, the Hillside 
Strangler, and the Zodiac Killer, to which Adamcik responds, "Those people were 
more [sic] amateurs compared to what we're going to be." (St. Ex. 94, p.6.) 
e. September 22,2006,08:28:11 a.m. 
[Transcriber's note: "Brian Draper is walking down school hallway. 
Brian Draper is talking to someone who appears to be walking with 
him. . .. He then walks by lockers where Cassie Stoddart is at her 
locker."] 
Brian Draper: Hey look it's Cassie. Hello Cassie. 
Cassie: Hello. 
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Brian Draper: (laughs) I'm getting you on tape. Okay. Say hi 
please. 
Cassie: Hi. 
(St. Ex. 94, pp.6-7.) 
f. September 22,2006,12:10:58 p.m. 
[Transcriber's note: 'Torey Adamcik is sitting at a desk with 
notebooks in front of him in a library or classroom type setting. 
Brian Draper has set up the camera so it tapes them while sitting at 
the desk. Brian Draper sits down .... "] 
Torey Adamcik: I was planning to kill him. 
Brian Draper: September 22nd 2006. We're escaping our fourth 
hour. We're writing our plan right now for tonight. It's gonna be 
cool. 
Torey Adamcik: For actually tonight. 
(St. Ex. 94, p.7.) At one point, while Adamcik writes, he says, "Cassie and Matt 
in the house," and Draper says, "[o]ur plan is supposed to happen tonight. So 
hopefully nothing will go wrong and everything will go smoothly so we can get our 
first kill done and started and we can keep going." (St. Ex. 94, p.9.) Adamcik 
then stated, "[fjor you future serial killers watching this tape," and later finishes 
his thought, telling his supposed audience, "[h]opefully you don't have to go 
through eight or nine failures like we have." (St. Ex. 94, p.1 0.) Brian Draper 
elaborated: 
As long as you're patient you know. And we were patient and 
everything paid off because our victim's home alone. So we've got 
our plan all worked out now. So. I'm sorry. I'm sorry to Cassie's 
family but she had to be the one. We have to stick with the plan. 
19 
And she's perfect. So, she's gonna die. (Inaudible) probably. And 
we have a new victim now. Her name is [M.C.]. She's ... 
Torey Adamcik: She's just a bitch so we gotta kill her. 
Brian Draper: She told me to be quiet and to shut up. So now's 
[sic] she's dead. 
(Id. (ellipsis original).) The two continued their talk, with references to people 
they would like to kill, references to Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris, and a 
discussion of how many "kills" would be desirable. Adamcik revealed he would 
like "at least twenty kills," and that "the perfect ending would be a school shoot 
out," after which they would kill themselves. (St. Ex. 94, p.11.) 
g. September 22.2006. 12:29:02 p.m. 
Brian Draper: How about Matt arrives in the, um, at the same time 
as Cassie. How about we, we hide inside the house. 
(St. Ex. 94, pp.14-15.) 
h. September 22. 2006. 09:53:20 p.m. 
[Transcriber's note: "It's dark and the two are in a vehicle."] 
Brian Draper: We're here in his car. The time is 9:50, September 
22nd, 2006. Um ... Unfortunately we have the grueling task of 
killing our two friends and they are right in that house just down the 
street. 
Torey Adamcik: We just talked to them. We were there for an 
hour. But ... 
Brian Draper: We checked out the whole house. We know there's 
lots of doors. There, there's lots of places to hide. Um, I unlocked 
the back doors. It's all unlocked. Now we just got to wait and uh .. 
yep, we're, we're really nervous right now but, you know, we're 
ready. 
Torey Adamcik: We're listening to the greatest rock band ever. 
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Brian Draper: We've been waiting for this for a long time. 
Torey Adamcik: Pink Floyd. Before we commit the ultimate crime 
of murder. 
Brian Draper: We've waited for this a long time. 
Torey Adamcik: A long time. 
Brian Draper: We'll stay tuned. 
(St. Ex. 94, p.1 (ellipses original).) 
i. September 22, 2006, 11 :31 :57 p.m. 
[Transcriber's note: "Two are in vehicle, driving.'l 
Brian Draper: We just killed Cassie. We just left her house. This is 
not a fucking joke. 
Torey Adamcik: I'm shaking. 
Brian Draper: I stabbed her in the throat. I saw her lifeless body. It 
just disappeared. Dude. I just killed Cassie. Oh, oh fuck. That felt 
like it wasn't even real. I mean it went by so fast. 
Torey Adamcik: Shut the fuck up. We gotta get our act straight. 
Brian Draper: It's okay. Okay. We'll, we'll explain (unable to 
understand). 
Torey Adamcik: No. 
Brian Draper: Okay. Bye. 
(St. Ex. 94, pp.1-2.) 
Testimony Of Forensic Pathologists 
An autopsy on Cassie's body was conducted on September 25, 2006, by 
Dr. Steve Skoumal, a forensic pathologist, who found Cassie had suffered thirty 
stab wounds, twelve of which were considered "potentially fatal." (Tr., vol. 2, 
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p.1649, L.1 - p.1650, L.17; p.1654, Ls.11-14; p.1657, L.19 - p.1713, L.21; St. Ex. 
99, pp.2-10.) Dr. Skoumal concluded "stab wounds to the trunk" caused Cassie's 
death. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1714, L.24 - p.1715, LA) 
Dr. Charles Garrison, M.D., board certified in general, clinical, anatomic 
and forensic pathology, was asked by the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab to 
reexamine Cassie's body after the initial autopsy was done by Dr. Skoumal. (Tr., 
vol. 2, p.1746, L.11 - p.1751, L.15.) Dr. Garrison examined Cassie's body on 
September 28, 2006, and concluded that two different types of knives were used 
to attack Cassie -- one type had serrated edges and one type had "a single-
edged blade in the sense that it only had one sharp edge." (Tr., vol. 2, p.1751, 
L.23 - p.1752, L.1; p.1778, L.14 - p.1780, Ls.14-24.) 
Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Draper and Adamcik together with one count of murder 
in the first degree and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in the first 
degree. (R., vol. I, pp.166-168.) Draper and Adamcik, through their respective 
counsel, filed motions to sever, which motions were granted. (R., vol. Ii, pp.413-
14; Tr., vol. 1, p.78, L.5 - p.98, L.18.) Draper filed a motion to suppress his fourth 
(videotaped) interview with detectives,S which, after a hearing, was denied in a 
8 Draper's suppression motion requested suppression of "any and all eVide,nce 
and statements obtained by any law enforcement officers or personnel at the 
time of the interrogations and interviews conducted with [him] in this case." (R., 
vol. Iii, p.411.) However, at the suppression hearing, Draper narrowed the scope 
of his suppression request to his fourth interview with law enforcement, which 
was videotaped. (R., vol. Iii, p.495 ("However, at the hearing for this matter 
counsel for the Defendant limited the scope of the Motion, moving only to 
suppress to the [sic] fourth video-taped interview of Mr. Draper, entered as 
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written memorandum decision.9 (R., vol. II, pp.411-12; R., vol. III, pp.495-511; 
see generally Tr., vol. 1, pp.103-225.) Draper filed a motion to dismiss the 
charges based on alleged errors at the preliminary hearing, which was denied by 
the trial court after a hearing held jointly with Draper's motion to suppress. (R., 
vol. II, pp.415-16; R., vol. III, pp.484-90; Tr., vol. 1, p.105, L.21 - p.106, L.1; 
p.225, L.15 - p.226, L.18.) 
After trial by a jury, Draper was convicted of both murder in the first 
degree and conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. (R., vol. IV, pp.729-
757; Tr., vol. 2, p.1920, L.4 - p.1922, L.22.) Draper filed a motion for a new trial, 
which was denied after argument by the respective parties. (R., vol. IV, pp.759-
60,765-75; Tr., vol. 2, p.1934, L.5 - p.1946, L.15.) Prior to sentencing, Draper 
filed an objection to the presentence investigation report and requested a new 
report be made, claiming it was not neutral and objective and did not comply with 
the criminal rules. (R., vol. IV, pp.791-92.) The trial court considered, and 
denied, Draper's motion for a new presentence report. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1966, Ls.10-
23; p.2294, L.11 - p.2296, L.19.) After a protracted sentencing hearing in which 
two psychologists testified, Draper was sentenced to serve a fixed period of 
confinement of life without parole for murder in the first degree, and 30 years 
fixed plus an indeterminate period of life for conspiracy to commit murder in the 
first degree. (R., vol. IV, pp.795-96; 8/24/07 Tr., p.58, L.6 - p.59, L.11.) Draper 
filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which was denied after a 
State's Exhibit 'E.' The Court limits its decision accordingly."); Tr., vol. 1, p.222, 
L.6 - p.223, L.2, p.225, Ls.5-14.) 
9 During trial, Draper unsuccessfully renewed his motion to suppress his 
videotaped fourth interview. (T r., vol. 1, p.1 055, L.1 0 - p.1 082, L.11.) 
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hearing. (R., vol. IV, pp.819-201, 831-832; see generally 4/14/08 Tr., pp.12-51.) 
Draper filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., vol. IV, pp.802-05.) 
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ISSUES 
Draper's statement of the issues on appeal is lengthy and need not be 
repeated here. 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Draper failed to show fundamental and reversible error in the trial court's 
instructions on the elements of first degree murder, or reversible error in its 
instructions on conspiracy to commit first degree murder? 
2. Has Draper failed to preserve his claim that his statements during the fourth 
interview were involuntarily coerced by the officer's promises of help and 
leniency? 
3. Has Draper failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to this 
case? 
4. Has Draper failed to show either that the presentence report was biased or 
exceeded the scope of LC.R. 32, or that he was entitled to have a parent present 
during his presentence interview? 
5. Has Draper failed to carry his burden of establishing that his sentences are 
cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
or article I, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution? 
6. Has Draper failed to establish an abuse of the sentencing court's discretion? 
7. Has Draper failed to carry his burden of establishing that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Draper Has Failed To. ShDW Fundamental And Reversible Error In The Trial 
CDurt'S InstructiDns On The Elements Of First Degree Murder. Or Reversible 
Error In Its InstructiDns On CDnspiracy To. CDmmitFirst Degree Murder 
A. IntroductiDn 
For the first time Dn appeal Draper challenges the jury instructiDns on first 
degree murder, arguing that because the jury was nDt specifically instructed 
" 
"willful" means "intent to. kill," the trial CDurt cDmmitted fundamental error by 
ridding the state Df its burden Df proving that element (Le., "intent to. kill") Df first 
degree murder. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-23.) Draper is incDrrect. The trial CDurt 
prDperly instructed the jury Dn the elements Df murder, then Df first degree 
murder, in basic accDrdance with Idaho. Criminal Jury InstructiDns 701,10 703,11 
10 AlthDugh a renditiDn Df ICJI 701 was nDt specifically given by the trial CDurt, its 
instructiDn -- "Murder is the killing Df a human being withDut legal justificatiDn Dr 
excuse and with malice afDrethDught" -- was replicated in the elements 
instructiDn Dn murder (R, VDI. IV, p.708 (Instr. ND.12», which reads in part: 
3. the Defendant, BRIAN LEE DRAPER, engaged in cDnduct 
which caused the death Df Cassie JD StDddart, 
4. the Defendant acted withDut justificatiDn Dr excuse, and 
5. with malice afDrethDught. 
11 InstructiDn No.. 14 (R,vDI. IV, p.710), explained there are two. types Df malice, 
express and implied, and that express malice is "when there is manifested a 
deliberate intentiDn unlawfully to. take away the life Df a fellDw creature." 
AlthDUgh phrased differently than ICJI 703's current definitiDn Df express malice 
("when there is manifested a deliberate intentiDn unlawfully to. kill a human 
being"), the meanings are the same. 
In regard to. implied malice, InstructiDn NDS. 14 and 15 (R, vDI. IV, pp.710-
11) emplDY the fDrmer "abandDned and malignant heart" and "extreme 
26 
I 
704 and 705. Further, because "intent to kill" is inherent in ICJI 705's definition of 
"premeditation," in convicting Draper of first degree murder, the jury necessarily 
found he had such intent. (See R., vol. IV, p.709 (Instr. No. 13).) Draper has 
failed to show error, much less fundamental, reversible error, in the court's 
instructions on the elements of first degree murder. 
Draper has also failed to show reversible error in the instructions on the 
elements of conspiracy. It appears the seventh element of the conspiracy charge 
-- that "such act was done for the purpose of carrying out the agreement" -- was 
misnumbered with a handwritten "5" placed over the correct typed element 
number ("7") and read to the jury as a fifth possible overt act performed. (See R., 
vol. IV, p.713-14 (lnstr. No. 17); 4/17/07Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.16, L.6; ICJI No. 1101.) 
. Draper argues that the misnumbering of the elements relieved the state of its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the overt acts 
was done for the purpose of carrying out the conspiratorial agreement. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.23-29.) However, any juror reading or hearing the 
instructions as a whole, would have known that the phrase "such act was done 
for the purpose of carrying out the agreement" referred to each of the four 
indifference to the value of human life" phraseology that was updated in 2005. 
ICJI 703 now reads in relevant part: 
Malice is implied when: 
1. The killing resulting from an intentional act, 
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to 
human life, and 
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the 
danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. 
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preceding overt acts, and was not a separate overt act. Regardless of any error 
in misnumbering the seventh conspiracy element as the fifth overt act, such error. 
does not result in reversal because it was not fundamental and was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether the jury instructions, when considered as a 
whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable law is a 
question of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 
477,489,873 P.2d 122, 134 (1994). If the instructions given, taken as a whole, 
fairly and accurately reflect the law, there is no error. State v. Stricklin, 136 Idaho 
264,267,32 P.3d 158, 161 (Ct. App. 2001). To be reversible error, any error in 
the jury instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining 
party. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998); State v. 
Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,564,861 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1993). Even where 
an element of a crime has impermissibly been omitted from the jury instructions, 
to be reversible error, the instruction must still mislead the jury or prejudice the 
defendant. State v. Hansell, 141 Idaho 587, 590-91,114 P.3d 145, 148-49 (Ct. 
App. 2005). ' 
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C. Draper Has Not Properly Preserved Or Presented His Claim That It Was 
Error Not To Instruct The Jurv 'Willful" Means "Intent To Kill" Because He 
Did Not Raise It Below And Has Not Shown It Was Fundamental Error; 
Even If His Claim Is Considered By This Court, Draper Has Failed To 
Show Any Basis For Reversal 
Ordinarily, a party may not "assign as error the giving of or failure to give 
an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider . 
its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the 
grounds of the objection." I.C.R. 30(b). However, even absent a timely objection 
in the trial court, claims of instructional error are reviewable for the first time on 
appeal under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 
748, 170 P.3d 886, 891 (2007). "An error is fundamental only when it 'so 
profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice. and deprives the 
accused of his fundamental right to due process.'" Id. (quoting State v. Law, 121 
Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992». Before the appellate court will 
engage in a fundamental error analysis, the appellant must establish that the trial 
court committed an error. Anderson, 144 Idaho at 748,170 P.3d at 891. 
Draper asks this Court to review his claim of instructional error under the 
fundamental error doctrine, claiming the jury instructions failed to define "willful" 
as "intent to kill" with respect to first degree murder, and "relieved the State of its 
burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
denied [him] his constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.8.) Draper has failed to show the fundamental error doctrine is applicable 
to this case because he has failed to show any error, much less an error "so 
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egregious that it produced manifest injustice by violating [his] due process rights." 
Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749,170 P.3d at 892. 
While the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
burden only extends to each essential element of the offense for which the 
defendant is being tried, see Stricklin, 136 Idaho at 268,32 P.3d at 162, and to 
any fact that increases the maximum sentence the court can impose, Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (any fact that increases sentence beyond 
statutory maximum must be submitted to jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt). Contrary to Draper's arguments on appeal, the trial court correctly 
instructed the jury on the state's burden of proof and the essential elements of 
first degree murder. Draper's assertion that the state was relieved of its burden 
of proving "intent to kill" as a necessary element of first degree murder because it 
is hidden within the meaning of "willful" is incorrect. The trial court properly 
instructed the jury on the elements of murder, although using ICJI 703's former 
language regarding express and implied malice, and then, on first degree murder 
as specifically set out in the current version of ICJI 705. (See R., vol. IV, pp.708-
712 (Instr. Nos.12-15).) 
Further, the jury was in fact instructed that Draper had to have the intent to 
kill Cassie in order to be convicted of first degree murder. In Instruction No. 13, 
which replicates ICJI 705, the jury was informed that "intent to kill" is inherent in 
the definition of "premeditation," which the jury necessarily found (as a "willful, 
deliberate, and premeditated killing") in convicting Draper of first degree murder. 
That instruction states, in part, "[p]remeditation means to consider beforehand 
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whether to kill or not to kill, and then to decide to kill." (R., vol. IV, p.709.) Draper 
argues that even though the jury found he decided to kill Cassie when he 
premeditated her murder, it did not necessarily find he had such intent when he 
began stabbing her -- which, he argues, violates the rule that "there must exist a 
union ... of act and intent .... " (Appellant's Brief, p.17; see I.C. § 18-114.) In 
effect, Draper asks this Court to find that although he had the intent to kill Cassie 
during his premeditation moment before he stabbed her, he no longer had the 
intent to kill her when he actual/y stabbed her. Such a possibility defies common 
sense and logic, and should not be embraced by this Court. 
In Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 105, 190 P.3d 920,924 (Ct. App. 
2(08), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered the impact of the deficient 
performance by Sheahan's trial counsel for failing to object to a jury instruction 
on malice which "lowered the State's burden of proof on the element of the 
offense" of first degree murder by adding an instruction (to a correct instruction) 
that incorrectly defined malice as "the desire to annoy or injure another or the 
intent to do a wrongful act." In determining whether Sheahan suffered prejudice 
under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the court of appeals 
considered whether the jury's finding of malice may have been based on the 
incorrect instruction. The court concluded it was not: 
An instruction was given that defined premeditation and 
guided the jury as follows: 
Premeditation means to consider beforehand whether 
to kill ornot to kill, and then decide to kill. ... 
31 
Being so instructed, the jury found Sheahan guilty of first 
degree murder. Because the jury found that he premeditated the 
murder, forming the intent to kill in advance of committing the act, 
the guilty verdict could not have been affected by the erroneous 
instruction indicating that the malice element could be satisfied by a 
mere "desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a 
wrongful act." 
Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 106,190 P.3d at 925 (emphasis added). 
As Sheahan demonstrates, any danger that the jury may have convicted 
Draper of first degree murder without finding he had the intent to kill was 
overcome by the fact that Draper's jury found, as did Sheahan's, "that he 
premeditated the murder, forming the intent to kill in advance of committing the 
act." kL. Notably, Sheahan makes no mention that it may have been possible for 
Sheahan to have had the "intent to kill" while he premeditated his victim's death, 
but abandoned that intent between then and the time he actually committed the 
murder. The jury instructions in Draper's case, viewed as a whole, fairly and 
accurately reflect the law and the state's burden of proof. Draper's claim fails to 
establish the instructions in regard to "willful" were erroneous. 
Even assuming the instructions are erroneous, Drapefhas failed to show 
they resulted in a due process violation entitling him to challenge the instructions 
for the first time on appeal. A jury instruction violates due process if it "fails to 
give effect" to the requirement that "the State must prove every element of the 
offense" beyond a reasonable doubt. kL. The district court correctly instructed 
the jury as to the elements of the offense of first degree murder and the state's 
burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (R., vol. IV, pp.70B-711 
(lnstr. Nos. 12-15.) The instructions given by the trial court follow the ICJI pattem 
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instructions for murder and first degree murder. (See ICJI Nos. 701, 703, 704, 
705.) That Draper believes the t?rm "willful" should have been specifically 
defined in accordance with a comment found in State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 258, 
690 P.2d 293 (1984) does not establish an error in the instructions "so egregious" 
as to produce manifest injustice in violation of his due process rights. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-15.) Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. 
Draper has, therefore, failed to demonstrate any fundamental error entitling him 
to review of his claim for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this Court considers Draper's instructional error claim for the first 
time on appeal, and finds the instructions erroneous, any error is harmless. As 
explained in State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442,224 P.3d 509, 511 (Ct. App. 2009): 
However, even when a fundamental error has occurred, this 
Court will not reverse a conviction if the error was harmless. 
[Citations omitted.] A harmless error analysis may be applied in 
cases involving improper instructions on a single element of the 
offense or even when a court omits an essential element from the 
instructions to the jury. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9·15, 
119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); State v. Love/ace, 140 
Idaho 73, 79, 90 P.3d 298, 304 (2004); .... 
In determining whether the error is harmless, the "inquiry [is]: is it clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would. have found the defendant 
guilty absent the error." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,16 (1999) (finding 
trial judge's failure to instruct on the element of materiality harmless given that 
"no jury could reasonably find that Neder's failure to report SUbstantial amounts 
of income on his tax returns was not 'a material matter'" since the "evidence 
supporting materiality was so overwhelming"); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 
(1986) (concluding harmless error analysis applies to instruction that 
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impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on malice); State v. Hickman, 146 
Idaho 178, 182, 191 P.3d 1098, 1102 (2008) (holding "the omission of the 
element that the property taken be financial transactions cards is harmless error" 
given the jury's conclusion Hickman took and withheld the victim's wallet, and the 
uncontroverted evidence that the wallet contained financial transaction cards). 
In light of the evidence presented at trial, which is set forth in detail in the 
Statement of the Facts, supra, this Court can conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt that even if the jury had been instructed as Draper claims they should have 
been, that "willful" means "intent to kill", the jury would have found him guilty of 
murder in the first degree. Thus, even if Draper has demonstrated fundamental 
error in relation to the jury instructions on "willful," he is not entitled to relief 
because any error was harmless. 
D. The Trial Court's Misnumbering Of The Elements Of Conspiracy Did Not 
Confuse The Jury; Even If Error, It Does Not Constitute Reversible Error 
Draper also claims the trial court committed reversible error by 
misnumbering the seventh conspiracy element ("such act was done for the 
purpose of carrying out the agreement") as a fifth overt act allegedly performed 
by one of the parties to the conspiracy agreement. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-29; 
4/17/07 Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.16, L.6.) Draper claims that the numbering miscue 
caused the jury to treat that element as one of the possible overt acts, and, "[a]s 
a result, the State was relieved of its burden of proving this element of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and [Draper] was denied his constitutional rights to 
due process and to a jury triaL" (Appellant's Brief, p.24.) 
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Although the seventh element of the conspiracy charge appears to have 
been misnumbered and designated and read to the jury as if it were a fifth 
possible overt act (see R., vol. IV, p.713-14 (Instr. No. 17); 4/17/07 Tr., p.15, L.7-
p.16, L.6; ICJI No. 1101), the jury instructions as a whole would have informed 
any reasonable juror the phrase "such act was done for the purpose of carrying 
out the agreement" referred to each of the four preceding overt acts, and was not 
a separate overt act. Further, despite any error in misnumbering the seventh 
conspiracy element as a fifth overt act, such an error does not result in reversal 
because it was not fundamental and was harmless. 
In reviewing the flawed instruction, Instruction No, 17, the trial court read 
the sixth element of the conspiracy charge as follows: 
6. One of the parties to the agreement performed at least one 
of the following acts: 
1. On or about the 29th and 30th days of August 
2006, Brian Lee Draper did purchase and/or 
receive knives that were used in the 
commission of the murder of Cassie Stoddart. 
2. On or about the 21 st and/or 22nd days of 
September 2006, Brian Lee Draper, did travel 
to the residence located at 11372 Whispering 
Cliffs, Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho, with 
Torey Michael Adamcik to commit the murder 
of Cassie Stoddart. 
3. On or about the 22nd and or 23,d days of 
September 2006, Brian Lee Draper, did 
retrieve from a vehicle a change of clothes, 
mask, and murder weapons which were used 
in the commission of the murder of Cassie 
Stoddart. 
4. On or about the 22nd or 23,d days of September 
2006, Brian Lee Draper, did lie in wait in a 
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downstairs portion of the residence located at 
11372 Whispering Cliffs, Pocatello, Bannock 
County, Idaho, in preparation in committing the 
murder of Cassie Stoddart. 
5. Such act was done for the purpose of carrying 
out the agreement. 
(R., vol. IV, pp.713-14; 4/17/07 Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.16, L.6.) 
Although there is no way to know whether the jury's copies of the jury 
instructions reflected the over-write of the typed "7" with a handwritten "5" that is 
clearly evident on clerk's record copy (see R., vol. IV, p.714), the jury would have 
easily been able to conclude that overt act "5" was really the seventh element of 
the conspiracy charge, and had to be found in connection with whatever overt act 
was found. By itself, the misnumbered sentence cannot possibly be one of the 
"following acts" introduced by the preliminary sentence of element 6. First, the 
phrase "such act was done for the purpose of carrying out the agreement" does 
not describe any act at all, but rather, a purpose for whatever "such act" it is 
referring to. Second, the only acts reasonably referred to by the misnumbered 
sentence are the immediately preceding acts 1 through 4 -- apart from the 
mislabeled sentence, they are the only acts specifically enumerated after being 
introduced as the "following acts." Further, Instruction No. 17-A informed the 
jury, "The defendant is not guilty of Conspiracy if the defendant in good faith 
withdrew by informing another party to the conspiracy of the defendant's 
withdrawal before any party performed an act for the purpose of carrying out the 
agreement." (R., vol. IV, p.715 (emphasis added).) The converse meaning of 
that instruction is obvious -- a defendant is guilty of conspiracy after "any party 
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performed an act for the purpose of carrying out the agreement." In short, the 
only way the misnumbered sentence makes any sense is if read to require a 
finding that anyone of the four overt acts "was done for the purpose of carrying 
out the agreement." Taken as a whole, and read reasonably both internally and 
in conjunction with Instruction No. 17-A, the misnumbering on Instruction No. 17 
did not prevent the jury from understanding that any of the first four alleged overt 
acts, in order to be found, had to have been done for the "purpose of carrying out 
the agreement" between Adamcik and Draper. Stricklin, 136 Idaho at 267, 32 
P.3d at 161. 
Moreover, Draper's failure to object to Instruction No. 17 precludes him 
from asserting instructional error on appeal unless he can demonstrate 
fundamental error. State v. McAway, 127 Idaho 54, 60, 896 P.2d 962, 968 
(1995); State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322 (1991). Here, viewing 
Instruction No. 17 by itself and/or in context of the instructions as a whole, the 
only reasonable way the jury could have understood the misnumbered provision 
was as a prerequisite to finding anyone of the four preceding overt acts true. 
Inasmuch as that is the only way the provision makes sense, Draper has failed to 
demonstrate that misnurnbering it constitutes fundamental error. 
Even if this Court finds that an element of the crime of conspiracy was 
impermissibly omitted from the jury instructions,12 to be reversible error, the 
12 According to State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 
(2007), the omission of an essential element of a crime from a jury instruction 
constitutes fundamental error, H[hJowever, even when a fundamental error has 
occurred, this Court will not reverse a conviction if the fundamental error was 
harmless." Here, of course, the court did not omit the element, only 
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instruction must still mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant. Hansell, 141 
Idaho at 590-91, 114 P.3d at 148-49. In such a situation, a harmless error 
analysis may be applied, Hansen, 148 Idaho at _, 224 P.3d at 511, to 
determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have found 
the defendant guilty absent the error, Neder, 527 U.S. at 16. Based upon the 
evidence presented during Draper's trial, as described in the Statement of Facts, 
supra, this Court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even if the 
misnumbering miscue for the elements of the conspiracy charge had not 
happened, the jury would have found Draper guilty of conspiracy to commit first 
degree murder. Thus, even assuming Draper has demonstrated an omissiQnof 
an element of the crime of conspiracy resulted from the misnumbering of the 
elements in Instruction No. 17, he is not entitled to relief because any error was 
harmless. 
II. 
Draper Has Failed To Preserve His Claim That His Statements During The 
Fourth Interview Were Involuntarily Coerced By The Officer's Promises Of Help 
And Leniency 
A. Introduction 
Draper contends, for the first time on appeal, that his statements during 
his fourth police interview should be suppressed because "the officers used 
interrogation techniques such as offers of help and implied promises of leniency 
to coerce Brian into confessing." (Appellant's Brief, p.34.) Draper, however, did 
misnumbered it. For the reasons stated above, the error was not fundamental 
and any objection to the numbering should have been raised at trial. 
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not raise this issue below, and therefore did not preserve this claim for appellate 
review. 
B. Draper Has Failed To Preserve His "Coerced Confession" Claim 
It is well settled that issues not raised before the trial court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 181,824 P.2d 109, 112 
(1991); State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997). 
There is no indication in the recoid that Draper based his suppression 
motion in the trial court on any claim that his statements during the fourth 
interview were coerced by promises of help and leniency. Rather, Draper's 
motion to suppress stated in relevant part: 
This Motion is brought upon the grounds and for the reasons 
that the Defendant is a juvenile age sixteen (16) and was at the 
time of the questioning. He was not capable of knowingly and 
voiuntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment privileges under the US 
[sic] Constitution and similar provisions of the Idaho Constitution 
nor proceeding without counsel at the time of questioning. 
(R., vol. II, p.412.) At the suppression hearing, Draper's trial counsel argued that 
Draper's fourth interview, conducted after Draper had spent the previous night in 
jail, should have been suppressed because of Draper's young age, absence of a 
parent's presence, and the state's failure to show Draper's levels of education 
and maturity. (Tr., vol. 1, p.104, L.20 - p.105, L.17; p.217, L.3 - p.223, L.2.) 
Draper's trial counsel based the suppression motion on the contention Draper 
was not "capable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Fifth Amendment 
,,-
privileges" (R., vol. II, p.412 (emphasis added)) -- but nowhere in the testimony or 
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arguments presented at the suppression hearing is there any mention that the 
statements made by Draper in his fourth interview were involuntarily coerced by 
the officer's repeated offers of help and leniency. (See Tr., vol. 1, p.104, L.20-
p.105, L.17; p.217, L.3 - p.223, L.2.) 
The district court did not have the opportunity to review this issue, nor did 
the state have a chance to respond to it by presenting evidence and argument. 
There was no testimony or argument at the suppression hearing suggesting 
Draper's statements during the fourth interview were involuntarily coerced by any 
offers of help or leniency. Draper's claim is not appropriately raised for the first 
time on appeal; such a claim requires a trial court to engage in an analysis of 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a defendant's will was 
overbome by police coercion. State v. Radford, 134 Idaho 187,191,998 P.2d 
80,84 (2000); State v. Cordova, 137 Idaho 635,639,51 P.3d 449, 453 (Ct. App. 
2002). It is the appellant's burden to raise claims before the trial court. Because 
Draper failed to preserve his "coerced confession" claim of error for appellate 
review, it should not be considered by this Court. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 
159, 161-62, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169-70 (2000) (basis for suppression not argued to 
the trial court was not preserved for appeal). 
C. The District Court's Ruling Regarding Draper's Competence Was Correct 
To the extent this Court may consider whether Draper knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights at the outset of his fourth 
interview with law enforcement, the state relies upon the trial court's 
"Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress" (R., vol. 
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III, pp.495-511), attached as Appendix A to Respondent's Brief, and incorporated 
as if fully set forth herein, for its response. 
IIi. 
Draper Has Failed To Show That The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies To This 
Case 
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in 
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. 
Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate 
to application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. 
Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). Draper has failed to show 
that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and therefore the doctrine is 
inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115,121,937 
P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown, they 
would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal.13 State 
v. Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of 
errors deemed harmless). 
13 The assertion by Draper that "(t]he only evidence presented regarding [his] 
actually stabbing C.S. was [the fourth police] video interview" (Appellant's Brief, 
p.41) is inaccurate. The homemade videotape (St. Ex. 81) recorded Draper 
saying right after Cassie's murder, "I stabbed her in the throat. I saw her lifeless 
body. It just disappeared. Dude. I just killed Cassie. Oh, oh fuck. That felt like 
it wasn't even real. r mean it went by so fast." (St. Ex. 94, p.1.) 
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IV. 
Draper Has Failed To Show Either That The Presentence Report Was Biased Or 
Exceeded The Scope of I.C:R. 32, Or That He Was Entitled To Have A Parent 
Present During His Presentence Interview 
A Introduction 
On appeal, Draper asserts the district court erred by: (1) "not disregarding 
the presentence report and ordering that a new report be prepared because the 
report was biased" and not in conformity with I.C.R. 32 (Appellant's Brief, pp.42-
47), and (2) not allowing one of Draper's parents to be present during his 
presentence interview, thus violating his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination (Appellant's Brief, pp.48-53). 
This Court should decline to consider the merits of Draper's claims 
because they were not raised below on the same grounds he now presents on 
appeal and he has failed to allege, much less demonstrate, manifest disregard in 
relation to his first claim, or fundamental error regarding his second claim. Even 
if his claims are considered, this Court should reject Draper's first claim because 
the presentence investigator's questions complied with I.C.R. 32 and were not 
biased -- they merely sought clarification of Draper's version of events. The 
Court should also reject Draper's second claim because Draper had no right, 
constitutional or otherwise, to have a parent present during his presentence 
interview. 
B. Standards Of Review 
The district court has broad discretion in determining what evidence is to 
be admitted at a sentencing hearing. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 275, 1 
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P.3d 299, 303 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Viehweg, 127 Idaho 87, 92, 896 P.2d 
995, 1000 (Ct. App. 1995). It is presumed that a sentencing court was able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and 
material which was presented to it during the sentencing process, to disreQard 
the irrelevant and unreliable evidence, and to properly weigh the remaining 
evidence which may be in conflict. State v. Pierce, 100 Idaho 57, 58, 593 P.2d 
392 (1979); State v. Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 925, 854 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 
1993); State v. Holmes, 104 Idaho 312, 314,658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App. 1983). 
"Constitutional issues are questions of law subject to free review by this 
Court." State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314,316 (2004). 
C. Draper Has Failed To Show Any Error In The Trial Court's Refusal To 
Order A New Presentence Report 
After reviewing the PSI, Draper's counsel filed an "Objection to 
Presentence Investigation" in which he complained: 
That the investigation done by Ms. Fuentes was not 
conducted according to Idaho Criminal Rule 26[14] and contains 
inappropriate opinions from Ms. Fuentes. 
Rather than conducting a neutral and objective investigation 
Ms. Fuentes engaged in police investigations contrary to the 
criminal rule and case decisions of the state of Idaho. 
(R., vol. IV, pp.791-92 (underlining omitted).) At the beginning of the sentencing 
hearing, Draper's attorney asked that his motion for a new PSI be heard later --
after he presented some evidence. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1966, Ls.12-23.) Draper's 
attorney also advised the court Draper believed the factual information in the PSI 
14 It appears that the reference to Rule 26 was made in error, and the motion 
should have cited Rule 32 instead. 
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was correct, but that Draper had "disagreements with the opinions and 
recommendations." (Tr., vol. 2, p.1967, Ls.13-24.) After the defense witnesses 
testified, the district court took up Draper's motion, and Draper's counsel argued: 
Pursuant to the rule, we don't feel the presentence is valid. 
According to the Rule, it's supposed to be objective. I think based 
on the testimony [of] the witnesses that were called, there is very 
little if no contact with the family other than mom and dad. We think 
that the presentence is slanted -- is basically pointed towards the 
law enforcement version without balance and for those reasons and 
pursuant to the Idaho Criminal Rule, we would object to the 
presentence report, and we would ask the Court to order a new 
report with a different presentence investigator -- possibly outside 
this district because of all of the emotion and publicity so that we 
can get a neutral and objective assessment of that. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.2294, L.14 - p.2295, LA.) 
The prosecutor argued in response that everything the presentence 
investigator said in the report complied with I.C.R. 32, and Draper's counsel 
replied, "none of the family was contacted other than mom and dad, and we just 
don't think that's an objective effort to comply with the Rule to be neutral and 
objective and not biased towards one side or the other." (Tr., vol. 2, p.2295, L.14 
- p.2296, L.8.) The trial court denied Draper's motion, stating: 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32 does govern standards and 
procedures for presentence investigation reports. 
Ms. Fuentes is a very experienced presentence investigator, 
although, perhaps not perfect, I think the presentence she prepared 
in this case is in conforrnance with Idaho Crirninal Rule 32. So the 
request for a new presentence is denied. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.2296, LS.11-19.) 
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1. Draper's Claim That The Presentence Investigator Conducted An 
Improper Police Investigation Or Interrogation Has Not Been 
Preserved 
Draper argues on appeal: 
Rather than simply providing the defendant's version of events, the 
investigator interrogated Brian regarding his version of events over 
the course of two days. After going over Brian's version ·of events, 
the presentence investigator questioned Brian using information 
from the police reports and specifically asked Brian detailed 
questions about the crime. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.43-44.) Because Draper's claim on appeal is based on 
different grounds than were presented to the trial court, he has failed to preserve 
the issue for appellate review. 
It is a long-standing rule in Idaho that an appellate court will not consider 
issues, including constitutional issues, which are presented for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322,1324 (1991); State 
v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 181,824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991). Failure to raise an 
issue in the district court, thereby denying the trial court the opportunity to rule on 
the alleged error, constitutes a waiver of that issue on appeal. Martin, 119 Idaho 
at 579,808 P.2d at 1324; Mauro, 121 Idaho at 181, 824 P.2d at 112. Likewise, 
an objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for 
excluding evidence. State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 879, 11 P .3d 494, 498 (Ct. 
App. 2000); State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125, 127 (Ct. App. 
1993) (limiting appellate review to scope of objection). 
Even though Draper's written objection asserted the PSI investigator 
conducted improper "police investigations," Draper's trial counsel did not follow 
up on that allegation at the sentencing hearing, thus preventing the trial court 
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from considering and ruling on it. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.42-43; Tr., vol. 2, 
p.1966, L.10 - p.1968, L.14; p.2294, L.11 - p.2296, L.19.) Instead, at the 
sentencing hearing, Draper's counsel based his objection on the investigator's 
alleged failure to contact any other members (beyond mother and father) of 
Draper's family, an argument Draper has not pursued on appeal. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.42-47.) 
When Draper's trial counsel was given the opportunity to explain his 
objections to the PSI report at the sentencing hearing, he did not cite any 
question or comment as inappropriate, he did not reveal how the report was 
slanted or pointed towards the law enforcement version, and he did not inform 
the court that he was generally challenging the questions asked by the 
investigator, much less that he was claiming the questions constituted "police 
investigations." For these reasons, Draper failed to preserve the issue for 
appeal. 
When no objection has been made to a presentence report at the 
sentencing hearing, and the report substantially addresses the points required by 
court rule, Idaho's appellate courts will not review a challenge to the report raised 
for the first time on appeal. State v. Viehweg, 127 Idaho 87, 91, 896 P.2d 995, 
999 (Cl. App. 1995); State v. Thacker, 98 Idaho 369, 370, 564 P.2d 1278, 1279 
(1977). An exception to this rule is that, if there is "manifest disregard" for the 
provisions of I.C.R. 32, the questions concerning a presentence report may be 
reviewed on appeal even if no objection was made below. Viehweg, 127 Idaho 
at 91; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,566,650 P.2d 707, 708 (Cl. App. 1982). 
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As will next be discussed, the PSI in Draper's case complied with Rule 32 and 
was not biased; therefore, Draper cannot demonstrate a manifest disregard for 
the provisions of Rule 32, and his failure to object in the trial court on the same 
grounds he presents on appeal precludes consideration of this issue. 
2. The Presentence Investigator's Questions Conformed With Rule 32 
And Were Not Biased 
Draper characterizes the presentence investigator's questions as improper 
"interrogation" and "police investigations" that went beyond the scope of Rule 32 
of the Idaho Criminal Rules (hereinafter "Rule 32"). (Appellant's Brief, pp.41-47.) 
Draper states: 
Rather than simply providing the defendant's version of events, the 
investigator interrogated Brian regarding his version of events over 
the course of two days. After going over Brian's version of events, 
the presentence investigator questioned Brian using information 
from the police reports and specifically asked Brian detailed 
questions about the crime. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.43-44.) 
The main point of Draper's argument is that, by asking detailed or pointed 
questions about Draper's crimes, the presentence investigator exceeded the 
scope of Rule 32. However, Draper has failed to provide any authority that 
supports such a claim and a review of the rule shows his claim to be without 
merit. 
Rule 32 sets forth the standards and procedures for presentence 
investigation reports. Rule 32 provides, in part: 
(b) ... whenever a full presentence report is ordered, it shall 
contain the following elements: 
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(1) The description of the situation surrounding 
the criminal activity with which the defendant has 
been charged, including the defendant's version of 
the criminal act and the defendant's explanation for 
the act, .... 
(10) The presentence investigator's analysis of 
the defendant's condition. That analysis of the 
defendant's condition contained in the presentence 
report should include a complete summary of the 
presentence investigator's view of the psychological 
factors surrounding the commission of the crime or 
regarding the defendant individually which the 
investigator discovers. . .. 
The notion that a presentence investigator cannot ask detailed or probing 
questions about the facts of the case for which a defendant is pending 
sentencing is not well-taken. Rule 32 allows the investigator to obtain the 
defendant's version and explanation of the crime and to analyze "the defendant's 
condition," including "a complete summary of the presentence investigator's view 
of the psychological factors surrounding the commission of the crime or 
regarding the defendant individually which the investigator discovers." I.C.R. 
32(1), (10); see State v. Dowalo, 122 Idaho 761, 763-64,838 P.2d 890, 892-93 
(Ct. App. 1992) (presentence investigator's statements that Dowalo was 
manipulative and not honest on several issues, does not accept responsibility, 
and questioning the sincerity of his remorse ruled essentially an "analysis of the 
defendant's condition" which was required to be included under \.C.R. 32(b)(10». 
Going into Draper's interview, the presentence investigator had to know 
from the police reports and the trial that Draper had engaged in an series of lies, 
changing his story to fit each occasion, and minimizing his involvement at ev~ry 
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turn. Nonetheless, Draper contends on appeal, in essence, that the presentence 
investigator should have simply been a scribe for his latest version of events 
without questioning how his statements fit the known facts of the case. The 
horrific nature of Draper's crimes, combined with Draper's past deceit, demanded 
the presentence investigator do more than just repeat Draper's most current 
version of events 15 in order to give the court her "view of the psychological 
factors surrounding the commission of the crime or regarding the defendant 
individually which the investigator discovers." I.C.R. 32(b )(10). 
The questions asked by the presentence investigator were all reasonable. 
(See Appellant's Brief, p.44-45.) For instance, if, as Draper claimed, he believed 
he and Adamcik were playing a joke on Cassie, why was it necessary to take real 
knives with them? If Draper believed he and Adamcik were only going to scare 
Cassie as a joke, why didn't they take the camcorder inside the residence to 
capture the fun on film? Each question cited in Draper's appel/ate brief reflects a 
logical attempt by the interviewer to reconcile Draper's latest version of his 
crimes to the known facts -- and in doing so, provide greater insight into the . 
"psychological factors surrounding the commission of [Draper's] crime," and 
"[Draper] individual/y." I.C.R32(b)(10). The presentence investigator's questions 
were well within the scope of Rule 32. 
15 It should be recalled that in his fourth police interview, Draper indicated he 
stabbed Cassie in order to keep Adamcik from turning on him (8t. Ex. 19, 
12:43:40 - 12:44:01), but only after Adamcik came over to make sure she was 
dead and told Draper, "you need to stab her, you need to stab her" (St. Ex. 19, 
12:45:29-38). Draper said he then stabbed Cassie in one leg, but after Adamcik 
told him, "its not gonna work, she has to die" (St. Ex. 19, 12:45:45-52), and 
although he didn't want to, Draper indicated he stabbed Cassie three more times 
in her chest (8t. Ex. 19, 12:44:02-27). 
49 
Although State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215, 218, 868 P.2d 1231, 1234 
(1994), cited by Draper (see Appellant's Brief, pp.46-7), held that Wilkins was 
entitled to be resentenced, it was for the following reasons: 
At the sentencing hearing, Wilkins was required to testify to 
matters that went well beyond the facts of the case and information 
that would have been appropriate to determine whether he pleaded 
guilty freely and voluntarily. The trial court relied heavily on this 
testimony in sentencing Wilkins. Therefore, we conclude it is 
necessary to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. 
(Emphasis added.) Draper's reliance on Wilkins is misplaced; the Idaho 
Supreme Court stressed that the matters Wilkins was "required to testify" about 
at his sentencing hearing "went well beyond the facts of the case." !.Q., That is 
not the situation here, where Draper gave no indication of an unwillingness to 
undergo a presentence interview and all the questions asked by the interviewer 
related to the facts of Draper's case. Wilkins reinforces the appropriateness of 
the presentence interviewer's questions about the facts of Draper's crimes. 16 
16 Neither does Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), support Draper's claim 
(see Appellant's Brief, p.46) , which is impliedly based on the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. "In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that "[aJ 
criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to 
introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a 
psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing 
proceeding." !.Q., at 468. Draper's case is different. Draper was not facing a 
sentence of death, he was not "compelled" to respond to any of the PSI 
interviewer's questions, and the questions related to the facts of his current case. 
See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 (1984) (the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not ordinarily self-executing and must be affirmatively claimed by a 
person whenever self-incrimination is threatened); Jones v. Cardwell, 686 F.2d 
754, 756 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[WJhere, as here, the state's agent seeks from the 
convicted defendant a confession of additional criminal activity and that 
confession is used to enhance a defendant's sentence, we think it beyond 
peradventure that the defendant may properly claim the protection of the 
privilege against self-incrimination."). 
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Draper also takes issue with the presentence investigator's concluding 
comments, which were: 
Though Brian is only 17 -years-old, he made a choice to take 
the life of another human being, a choice the victim did not have. 
Brian and his co-defendant's actions ended forever the 
opportunities that laid ahead of this young woman. This is the type 
of behavior that we, as a society, cannot take a second chance at, 
because you cannot replace a life as you can a stolen television or 
broken window. Therefore, because of the serious nature of this 
offense, Brian's failure to take full responsibility for his actions, and 
for the protection of society; probation is not a viable option in this 
matter. 
(PSI, p.39.) 
Draper argues that the first part of the recommendation is "an appeal to 
emotion and is not a neutral statement by a neutral or detached party," and that 
the last sentence could have easily sufficed as a recommendation against 
probation. (Appellant's Brief, p.47.) However, the first two sentences of the 
recommendation are simply matter-of-fact statements that are beyond dispute. 
The third sentence, which states that society cannot take a second chance at this 
type of behavior, is hardly the "appeal[ ) to the emotions and sense of community 
outrage" that Draper suggests. (Appellant's Brief, p.47.) Notably, the 
presentence investigator's comments make no attempt to incite the reader by 
recounting the terrible details of Cassie's violent murder. Instead, the 
investigator chose to simply refer to "this ... type of behavior." (PSI, p.39.) 
Draper has failed to show that any of the concluding comments by the 
presentence investigator were inflammatory, incorrect, or contrary to Rule 32. 
The trial court's refusal to order a neW PSI was appropriate. 
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D. Draper Has Failed To Show That His Fifth Amendment Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination Was Violated By The Trial Court's Order Precluding 
Draper's Parents' Attendance At The Presentence Interview 
After Draper was convicted by the jury of first degree murder and 
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the trial court ordered a presentence 
investigation report ("PSI") be prepared by Probation and Parole, and that one of 
Draper's parents be present for the presentence interview. (R., vol. IV, p.755; 
Tr., vol. 2, p.1922, L.19 - p.1923, L.1.) However, after the presentence 
investigator (Ms. Fuentes) wrote a letter to the trial court asking that the 
presentence interview be done outside the presence of Draper's parents, the 
court rescinded its order, explaining: 
Every presentence investigation report contains defendant's 
version of the crime he or she was convicted of and the version of 
why the crime was committed or explanation for committing it and, 
you know, given the serious nature of the crime that was committed 
in this case, I think that I'm going to defer to Miss Fuentes' request 
and it will be ordered that she can interview Mr. Draper without 
parents. 
I can see where having a parent in the room would, perhaps, 
have a chilling effect on Mr. Draper's candid responses to some of 
her questions, so I think for an accurate presentence report that -- if 
she would sit down with him one-on-one and go over these things, I 
think it would be better for the administration of justice. [17] 
17 Ms. Fuentes explained: 
According to Criminal Rule 32 (b)(1) the PSI is suppose to include 
Mr. Draper's version of the crime and his explanation for it. I 
believe Mr. Draper (not wanting to disappoint his parents) may give 
his parent's explanation of the crime instead of his own or will not 
be as candid regarding the crime and why he did it. . 
Criminal Rule 32(b)(3)' also says the Presentence 
Investigation is supposed to include Mr. Draper's "social history, 
including family relationships." As a major source of this 
information is from Mr. Draper, I question whether he can be totally 
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(Tr., vol. 2, p.1937, L.17 - p.1938, L.9.) 
''': ' 
Contrary to Draper's claim on appeal, he had no right, constitutional or 
otherwise, to have a parent present during his presentence interview. Moreover, 
although Draper's trial counsel objected to the court's rescinding of its order 
permitting one of Draper's parents to attend the presentence interview, he did not 
state any constitutional basis for doing so -- therefore, that issue has not been 
preserved for review. 
1. Draper's Claim Of A Fifth Amendment Violation Has Not Been 
Preserved 
On appeal, Draper asserts for the first time that the trial court's order 
rescinding permission for one of Draper's parents to attend the presentence 
interview violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
because he (allegedly) could not voluntarily waive such a privilege without 
access to a parent. (Appellant's Brief, pp.48-53.) 
Although Draper's trial counsel argued below that the original trial court 
order should have been kept in force to allow one of Draper's parents to attend 
the interview, he did not mention Draper's Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination. (See Tr., vol. 2, p.1936, L.8 - p.1937, L.1 0.) That issue should 
honest regarding relationships (to include sexual relationships) or 
even substance abuse issues with a family member present. As 
the Court is aware, any areas of deception could reflect poorly on 
Mr. Draper if the truth should come out. I am also concerned the 
parents, in an effort to protect their son or themselves, will interfere 
with my interview if they do not like the direct questions regarding 
the crime or issues related to any abuse or neglect. 
(PSI materials, 5/7/07 Letter to Judge McDermott, p.i.) 
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not be considered for the first time in this appeal. Martin, 119 Idaho at 579, 808 
P.2d at 1324; Mauro, 121 Idaho at 181, 824 P.2d at 112. Even though Draper's 
counsel objected to the trial court's ruling, by doing so on different grounds than 
are being raised on appeal, the issue has not been preserved. Norton, 134 
Idaho at 879, 11 P.3d at 498; Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 454,849 P.2d at 127. 
It is a well-established principle of appellate law that, absent fundamental 
error, the failure to raise an issue before the trial court waives that issue for 
purposes of appeal. McAway, 127 Idaho at 60, 896 P.2d at 968; Martin, 119 
Idaho 577, 808 P.2d 1322. An error is fundamental if it "goes to the foundation or 
basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from 
the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court 
could or ought to permit him to waive." State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 
470,163 P.3d 1175, 1182 (2007). An error is not deemed fundamental and may 
not be reviewed for the first time on appeal if it could have been cured by a timely 
objection. State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 68-71, 951 P.2d 1288, 1295-98 (Ct. 
App. 1998). Had Draper's trial counsel presented his Fifth Amendment claim to 
the district court, any error could have been cured before the sentencing hearing. 
Moreover, Draper has not advanced a "fundamental error" argument on appeal; 
therefore his Fifth Amendment claim should not be considered. 
2. Draper's Fifth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated By Having His 
Presentence Interview Without A Parent Present 
Even if this Court considers Draper's claim that his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination was violated because one of his parents was 
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not allowed to attend his presentence interview, he has failed to demonstrate any 
constitutional violation. 
Draper is not entitled to claim that his presentence interview violated his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because he failed to assert 
that privilege before his interview. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429 
(1984) (the Fifth Amendment privilege is not ordinarily self-executing and must 
be affirmatively claimed). Moreover, the Fifth Amendment privilege does not 
extend to routine presentence interviews. In Baumann v. United States, 692 
F.2d 565, 574-77 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit was asked to apply Fifth 
Amendment protections to routine presentence investigation activities in non-
capital cases by requiring Miranda warnings prior to routine presentence 
interviews. The court concluded nothing "require[s] that a convicted defendant 
be warned of his right to counsel and his right to remain silent prior to submitting 
to a routine, authorized presentence interview." id. at 576. 
The Ninth Circuit contrasted Baumann's case to Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 
454 (1981), as follows: 
We believe it appropriate to read Estelle narrowly. This is 
not a bifurcated jury proceeding involving the potential of the 
ultimate penalty, death. Nor is the question of "remorse" which 
Baumann raises nearly as critical an issue in this case as was the 
question of further dangerousness in Estelle. In order to impose 
the death sentence, the state in Estelle was required to 
demonstrate the existence of certain aggravating factors by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no similar requirement in the 
sentencing phase of a trial under the federal mail fraud statute, a 
non-capital proceeding conducted before the district court and not a 
jury. We conclude that there is a substantial difference between a 
psychiatric examination of the defendant in a capital case which 
seeks to elicit evidence from the defendant relating to the critical 
aggravating factor of dangerousness, and a "routine" presentence 
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interview, restricted to gathering information upon which the district 
court, in its discretion, may rely when imposing sentence. As we 
read Estel/e, the Court's fifth amendment holding is limited to the 
distinct circumstances of the bifurcated capital proceedings 
presented in that case. The Court expressly cautioned that it did 
"not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily 
presented by all types of interviews and examinations that might be 
ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination." 
[Emphasis in Baumann]. Estelle, therefore, does not support 
Baumann's argument. 
kl (citations omitted); See Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(citing Baumann for proposition that "[r]outine, non-capital presentence interviews 
are not the type of situation in which Miranda warnings or counsel are required 
for purposes of the Fifth or Sixth Amendments.") In short, Estelle does not 
diminish Baumann's holding that a routine presentence interview (in contrast to 
the psychological evaluation used to prove an aggravating factor in the capital 
sentencing of Estelle) is not a critical stage of a proceeding to which Fifth 
Amendment protections attach. See also n.19, supra. 
Nor does Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 834 (2006), support 
Draper's underlying premise that the presentence interview implicated his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (See Appellant's Brief, p.51.) In 
Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court stated, "the real issue presented by [Estrada] 
is the significance and extent of a defendant's right against self-incrimination." 
. . 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. The ruling in Estrada was "limited to 
the finding that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel regarding 
only the decision of whether to submit to a psychosexual evaluation" for the 
purposes of sentencing. Estrada, 143 Idaho at 563, 149 P.3d at 838. Counsel's 
failure to advise the defendant of his Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to 
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submit to such an evaluation constituted deficient performance. & The Estrada 
decision specifically distinguished PSis from psychosexual evaluations, stating 
that "a presentence report relies greatly on information already available" 
whereas a psychosexual evaluation is "more in-depth and personal, and includes 
an inquiry into the defendant's sexual history, with verification by polygraph being 
highly recommended." Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837. The Estrada 
decision concluded that "a defendant is more likely to make incriminating 
statements in a psychosexual evaluation than during a routine presentence 
investigation." &; see Stuart v. State, 145 Idaho 467,471, 180 P.3d 506, 510 
(et. App. 2008) ("We hold that Stuart's routine presentence interview was not a 
critical stage of the adversarial proceedings.") Draper's claim that his PSI 
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is refuted by 
Estrada's explicit exception for routine PSis. 
A fundamental factor in the Estrada decision was that the psychosexual 
evaluation was based on incriminating information provided by the defendant. 
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 562, 149 P.3d at 837. Unlike in Estrada, where the 
defendant objected to the court's consideration of incriminating statements made 
in a psychosexual evaluation, Draper does not point to any particular comment 
he made during his presentence interview that incriminated him more than he 
already was by virtue of his convictions. Neither has Draper alleged that his 
attomey failed to advise him of his Fifth Amendment rights -- an allegation which 
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is essential to the court's holding in Estrada. Thus, Estrada has no applicability 
to Draper's case. 18 
Draper also notes that "several states require additional procedures 
beyond looking at the totality of the circumstances, requiring the presence of the 
juvenile's parents or other interested adult, such as an attorney, as a prerequisite 
to a valid Fifth Amendment waiver." (Appellant's Brief, p.53.) However, Draper 
does not disclose any case that indicates a minor convicted in adult court has a 
Fifth Amendment right to have a parent present during a presentence interview. 
The cases cited by Draper simply do not apply to his situation. 
Draper has failed to provide any authority supporting his assertion that his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was violated because he 
was not allowed to have a parent attend his presentence interview.19 
18 Even if Estrada applied to Draper's presentence interview, inasmuch as it 
does not permit an attorney to attend a psychosexual evaluation, it would not 
allow a parent to be present during a presentence interview .. 
19 Draper lastly contends that, even if his constitutional rights were not violated 
by the trial court's decision precluding Draper's parents from attending the 
presentence interview, "this Court should still find that Brian should have been 
allowed to have his parents present ... because he was a juvenile." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.54.) Draper presents no new legal authority, apart from a law review 
article, to support his claim. (See Tr., vol. 2, p.1936, Ls.8-16; Appellant's Brief, 
p.54.) He does, however, incorporate his arguments from Sections II(C) and 
IV(C)(2) of his Appellant's Brief into his argument. In addition to the preceding, 
as part of its response to Draper's argument here, the state incorporates its 
responses (Issues II and IV, supra) to those sections of Draper's appellate brief. 
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V. 
Draper Has Not Carried His Burden Of Establishing That His Sentences Are 
Cruel And Unusual Under The Eighth Amendment Of The United States 
Constitution Or Article I, § 6 OfThe Idaho Constitution 
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 
510,517,164 P.3d 790, 797 (2007): 
When reviewing a claim of cruel and unusual punishment the 
Court uses a proportionality analysis limited to cases which are "out 
of proportion to the gravity of the offense committed." State v. 
Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394, 825 P.2d 482, 491 (1992). The Court 
compares the crime committed and the sentence imposed to 
determine whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate. State 
v. Robertson, 130 Idaho 287, 289, 939 P.2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 
1997). This gross disproportionality test is equivalent to the 
standard under the Idaho Constitution which focuses on whether 
the punishment is so out of proportion to the gravity of the offense 
to shock the conscience of reasonable people. Brown, 121 Idaho 
at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. An "intra-and inter-jurisdictional" analysis 
is "appropriate only in the rare case" where the sentence is grossly 
disproportionate to the crime committed. State v. Matteson, 123 
Idaho 622, 626, 851 P.2d 336, 340 (1993). 
Here, Draper was sentenced to fixed life for his first degree murder of 
Cassie Stoddart, and life with thirty years fixed for conspiracy to commit first 
degree murder. Considering the evidence presented at trial, as shown by the 
Statement of Facts, supra, and incorporated into the state's response on this 
issue, as well as the state's response to Draper's excessive sentence claim, 
infra, Draper's sentences are not grossly disproportionate sentences and they do 
not shock the conscience of reasonable people. Draper's sentences were not 
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cruel and unusual under either the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution or Article I, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution.2o 
VI. 
Draper Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Draper contends that the sentences imposed, a fixed life sentence for first 
degree murder and a unified life sentence with thirty years fixed for conspiracy to 
commit first degree murder, are unduly harsh and excessive in light of his 
potential for rehabilitation, young age, cooperation with police, remorse, and 
other mitigating facts. (Appellant's Brief, pp.61-70.) Despite Draper's claim, the 
record supports the sentences imposed; Draper has failed to establish an abuse 
of discretion.21 
20 Draper's comparison with the laws of other countries is not compelling, and 
his comparison of sentences imposed on other defendants is not germane to his 
case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.57-61.) As explained by the Idaho Court of 
Appeals in State v. Wright, 147 Idaho 150, 160, 206 P.3d 856, 866 (Ct. App. 
2009): 
An "intra-and inter-jurisdictional" analysis is "appropriate only in the 
rare case" where the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 
crime committed. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517, 164 P.3d 
790, 797 (2007); State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851 P.2d 
336,340 (1993). 
21 Although Draper may have exhibited remorse for his crimes, a sentencing 
court is not bound by a defendant's statement of remorse, "but may discount its 
credibility and impact on sentencing." State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638,648,851 
P.2d 934, 944 (1993); State v. Kerrigan, 123 Idaho 508, 513, 849 P.2d 969, 974 
(Ct. App. 1993). The primary sentencing consideration in Idaho remains the 
protection of society. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627, 873 P.2d 877, 881 
(1994); State v. Moore, 78 Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103. Draper's 
expressions of remorse need not be further addressed. 
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B. General Legal Standards Applicable To Sentencing Claims 
"The 'primary consideration [in imposing sentence) is, and presumptively 
always will be, the good order and protection of society.'" State v. Butcher, 137 
Idaho 125, 137,44 P.3d 1180,1192 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Moore, 78 
Idaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101,1103 (1956». Other relevant objectives include 
deterrence of the defendant and the public, rehabilitation, and punishment or 
retribution. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008) 
(citing State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 671, 978 P.2d 227, 231 (1999». The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has "cautioned" that a fixed life sentence '''should be regarded 
as a sentence requiring a high degree of certainty - certainty that the nature of 
the crime demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty 
that the perpetrator never, at any time in his life, could be safely released.'" State 
v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, 388, 179 P.3d 346, 351 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting State 
v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,638,759 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 1988». This "high 
degree of certainty" is generally satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that 
it demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if 
the offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death 
is the only feasible means of protecting society." Id. 
On appeal, the question before this Court is not what sentence it would 
have imposed, but rather, whether the district court abused its discretion. 
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27 (citing State v. Toohill, 103 
Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct App. 1982». "To show an abuse of 
discretion, [Draper] must show that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, 
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is excessive under any reasonable view ofthe facts." Stevens, 146 Idaho at 149, 
191 P.3d at 227 (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 
(2002». Draper cannot meet that burden in this case. 
C. Draper Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Establishing That The District 
Court Abused Its Discretion In Imposing Sentence 
1. The Egregious Nature Of Draper's Crimes Warrant His Sentences 
Draper complains that he was sentenced "solely on the egregiousness of 
his offense and not giving adequate weight to the mitigating circumstances." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.62.) However, a fixed life sentence is appropriate where 
demanded by the nature of the crime or because of the lack of rehabilitation 
potential. State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 638, 759 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct. App. 
1988). The nature of the crimes committed by Draper alone warrants the 
sentences imposed. It is difficult to imagine a crime more deserving of a fixed life 
sentence than the vicious murder Draper perpetrated on Cassie while she was 
house~sitting at the Whispering Cliffs residence alone in the dark. The evidence 
presented at trial, as set out in the Statement of Facts, supra, reflects the 
depraved way in which Cassie's murder was planned and carried out, and is 
incorporated into the state's response to Draper's excessive sentence claim. In 
light of that evidence, the trial court's comments about Draper at the joint 
sentencing hearing for Draper and Adamcik were well-taken: 
Mr. Draper, you are certainly a very articulate young man. 
And I don't know what caused you to -- I guess can't [sic] think of 
another word -- to go. wrong. But Alan Brantley and Dr. 
Hatzenbuehler both indicated that you became obsessed with 
violent thoughts and wanting revenge against others, probably 
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started in the seventh grade. You felt alienated by your peers. 
They believed you were an extremely disturbed young man. 
You authored the Black River article and others.(22) Black 
River ended with your thoughts of going to Pocatello High School 
and killing students that you didn't like and getting your revenge, 
and you seemed pretty serious in that. 
They also indicated you were a severely disturbed individual, 
and that you have significant lack of insight. You're bright but use 
poor judgment and that you didn't get respect from your peers that 
you wanted. Because I guess, you know, kids can be cruel and 
teasing you about your stuttering, your anger against others 
escalated to rage. And they also indicated that there's a positive 
correlation between people who make threats and then thereafter 
carry them out. 
They also said that you and Mr. Adamcik were like-minded 
individuals, and the best predictor of future behavior is past 
behavior, and also that you're an entirely different individual than 
portrayed by family members and friends, and also that you should 
not be released into society. 
[Addressing Adamcik] Dr. Garrison said there were two 
knives used in killing Cassie Jo, in his opinion. On the video after 
the killing, when Mr. Draper was exclaiming his -- I don't know how 
else to put it -- his excitement and pleasure at just killing Cassie, 
you said, Shut the F up. We've got to getour act together. ... 
[AJnd the nature of the offense here you've both 
committed is, of course, the most serious we have in our society. 
There has to be punishment to deter both of you from doing this 
again and perhaps deter others from doing this. I have to consider 
22 The Black River story was found on Draper's laptop computer after a search 
warrant for Draper's computers was executed. (Tr., vol. 2, p.2298, L.16 - p.2299, 
L.19; p.2343, L.2 - p.23S2, L.S.) Also located on Draper's laptop were many 
photos related to the Columbine High School shootings (Tr., vol. 2, p.2308, L.2 -
p.2322, L.16), fantasized stories or ideas about school shootings and murders 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.2322, L.17 - p.2339, L.S), and lists of movies, the majority of which 
are slasher-type films (Tr., vol. 2, p.2339, L.6 - p.2340, L.2). 
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protection of society, which I'm considering very heavily here. And 
I suppose rehabilitation comes into this. 
You both methodically and intelligently planned to 
murder Cassie Stoddart. 
This was not a joke. I'm convinced neither one of you 
thought it was a joke. You put your masks on, you took your real 
knives, you went back to the house with the definite intention of 
killing her, which you did. You both wanted to be famous as killers. 
[sentence pronounced] .... 
You both have been convicted of murder in the first degree, 
and it's clear to the Court and the evidence at the trials, Cassie was 
savagely stabbed many times. The horror, fright and pain she 
surely encountered before death was certainly immense. You 
disguised yourselves with masks in darkness, which made it more 
frightening for her. You both were excited after the murder about 
the killing, and you both attempted to destroy the evidence initially. 
The killing was a barbarous, cold-blooded horrific act. . 
. . . You both have forfeited your privilege to live in a free 
society, and based on all the evidence and all that I've read, I'm 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that if you tNO, or either one 
of you, were released, that you would kill again. I'm convinced of 
that beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(8/24/07 Tr., p.54, L.15 - p.59, L.6.) 
The trial court first concluded that the horrific nature of Draper's crimes 
necessitated the lengthy sentences given. As noted, the certainty required for a 
fixed life sentence is satisfied where "the offense is so egregious that it demands 
an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence." Perez, 145 
Idaho at 388,179 P.3d at 351 (quoting Eubank, 114 Idaho at 638, 759 P.2d at 
929). Plainly, Draper's crimes were "so egregious" they demand an 
"exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence." On that basis 
64 
I 
\ 
I 
I. 
J 
. I 
, 
{ 
alone, this Court should uphold both of Draper's sentences. See State v. Cope, 
142 Idaho 492, 502, 129 P.3d 1241, 1251 (2006) ("This was a gruesome and 
horrifying crime that warrants the sentence imposed by the district court when all 
the appropriate information and factors are considered. It would be difficult to 
rationalize any other sentence."). 
2. The Trial Court Properly Considered Draper's Age 
Draper argues the district court "did not give any consideration to the 
mitigating factors, including [his] ... young age, .... " (Appellant's Brief, p.63.) 
Contrary to Draper's argument, the record shows the trial court considered, and 
was very distressed over, Draper's young age. Just before pronouncing 
sentence, the trial court said: 
This is -- this is an awful, awful situation, kids killing another 
kid. And it just -- you were all 16 when this happened and you two 
are 17 and Cassie, of course, is dead. Teenage killers perhaps 
should receive no mercy. I don't know. 
This is just awful. You two have -- you've ruined your lives. 
You've taken Cassie's life from her family, and you are so young. 
That's what makes it awful for me, to sentence two kids. That's 
what you are, you're kids. And -- but you've committed -- both 
committed the ultimate offense in our society. 
(8/24/07 Tr., p.56, L.21 - p.57, L.19.) After announcing the sentences, the trial 
court further explained to Draper and Adamcik: 
I'm not unmindful of how young you fellows are, but you 
commit a crime of this nature, and it's got to be -- it's got to be 
known, not only by those who commit it, but to others in the 
community that the punishment will not -- will not be so merciful. 
There's no mercy. Guys, I'm sorry. Guys, like I said, you guys are 
kids, but I just feel like this is a just sentence, given all the evidence 
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that I had to look at. So I -- I'm sorry. I hope you two can have 
some kind of a life in the state correctional facility. At least it's more 
than Cassie has. 
(8/24/07 Tr., p.59, Ls.12-23.) 
The assertion that the trial court failed to consider Draper's age is belied 
by the record. The trial court's comments show it considered Draper's age and, 
filtering it through the sentencing criteria, concluded it was outweighed by the 
nature of the offense and the likelihood Draper would not be rehabilitated. 
Draper also contends his age makes it "impossible to determine that he so 
utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only 
feasible means of protecting society." (Appellant's Brief, p.64.) In support of that 
claim, Draper cites Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (precluding death 
penalties for crimes committed by juveniles). However, Roper does not directly 
apply to Draper's case because it considered the propriety Of. capital punishment 
for crimes committed by juveniles. Nor has Draper provided any compelling 
authority to show that the underlying rationale of Roper -- that juveniles often 
make poor decisions due to immaturity and incomplete brain development --
should preclude fixed life sentences for juveniles found guilty of murder. 
3. The Trial Court's Belief That Draper Would Kill Again If Released 
Was Based On The Evidence And Testimony -- Not On 
----- Misconstruing The Findings Of Alan Brantley Or Dr. Hatzenbuehler 
Draper alleges the district court "misconstrued the findings of Alan 
Brantley, an FBI profiler, and Dr. Hatzenbuehler,[23] who performed the 
23 Dr. Hatzenbuehler is licensed psychologist who was appointed by the trial 
court to conduct a psychological evaluation on Draper. (Tr., vol. 2, p.2193, Ls.5-
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psychological evaluation, as well as the evidence presented,by finding that Brian 
would kill again.,,24 (Appellant's Brief, p.62.). However, the evidence and 
testimony of the trial and sentencing in Draper's case fully warrants the trial 
court's view that Draper would kill again if released; the court did not reach that. 
opinion by misconstruing the findings of Brantley and Hatzenbuehler. The trial 
court's opinion that Draper would kill again if released into society is another way 
of saying Draper had little or no chance of being rehabilitated. 
The trial court reached its conclusion that Draper would kill again "based 
on all the evidence and all tha.t [it] read." (8/24/07 Tr., p.S8, L.25 - p.S9, L.5.) 
Indeed, the evidence and testimony presented at trial and sentencing were more 
than enough for the trial court to base its opinion on. The Statement of Facts, 
supra, as well as the information gleaned at sentencing, infra, support the trial 
court's opinion that Draper would likely kill again if released from custody. That 
Draper killed Cassie -- a high school friend to whom he bore no grudge -- simply 
for the thrill of terrorizing and brutally killing a human being, reveals that the bar 
keeping Draper from committing violent acts is set extremely low. 
10; see 8/6/07 Psych. Eval. (attached to 8/9/07 letter to trial court by PSI 
investigator).) As part of her psychological evaluation, Dr. Hatzenbuehler asked 
Dr. Amy JarchoW, another psychologist, to conduct a full neuropsychological 
evaluation on Draper. (Tr., vol. 2, p.2197, Ls.7-10.) Dr. Jarchow diagnosed 
Draper as having attention and hyperactivity disorders ("ADHD"). (Tr., vol. 2, 
p.2197, L.21 - p.2198, LA.) 
24 The underlying assumptions of Draper's claim are: (1) the psychologists' 
findings on the likelihood Draper would kill again were contrary to the trial court's 
opinion; (2) the trial court "misconstrued" the psychologists' contrary findings; (3) 
the trial court's opinion was based on (or influenced by) its "misconstrued" view 
of the psychologists' findings; and (4) the trial court was under some obligation to 
follow the psychologists' actual findings. 
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The district court's opinion that Draper would kill again was not contrary to 
the testimony of Brantley or Hatzenbuehler. Brantley, a psychologist who 
formerly worked over twenty years for the F.B.I., evaluated Draper under a 
checklist he formulated while with the F.B.I. labeled "Traits and Characteristics of 
Violent Offenders." (Tr., vol. 2, p.1981, L.4 - p.1983, L.9; p.1996, L.6 - p.1998, 
L.11.) According to Brantley's assessment, there was a "low probability that Mr. 
Draper, in prison, is going to initiate violence against others." (Tr., vol. 2, p.2033, 
Ls.2-4.) Despite stating Draper was "treatable," Brantley concluded that if Draper 
was released into the community in the future, there would be "probably a 
medium level of him replicating the kinds of violence that we see here again in 
the future," which risk level could "go upward or downward depending on 
circumstances .... " (Tr., vol. 2, p.2025, L.24 - p.2042, L.1; p.2033, Ls.11-20; 
p.2038, Ls.1-6.) Brantley explained he was not making any statement about 
whether Draper should have the possibility of being released in the future -- that 
was up to the court. (Tr., vol. 2, p.2043, Ls.11-17.) 
Dr. Hatzenbuehler testified that, due to Draper's age, it was not possible to 
provide a firm risk assessment on him. (Tr., vol. 2, p.2210, Ls.6-17; p.2225, L.17 
- p.2226, L.17; see 8/6/07 Psych. Eva!., p.14 (attached to 8/9/07 letter to trial 
court by PSI investigator).) However, Dr. Hatzenbuehler adapted the "HCR-20" 
evaluation, typically used to assess the risk of violence for adults, and concluded 
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(with caution) that the evaluation "suggests [Draper] is a moderate[25] risk of 
reoffense when he is not taking medication and when he is in the presence of 
destablizing [sic] influences." (Tr., vol. 2, p.2211, L.20 - p.2212, L.24; see 8/6/07 
Psych. Eva!., p.19.) 
Draper's claim that the trial court misconstrued the findings of Brantley 
and Hatzenbuehler is unfounded. Although neither testified that Draper would kill 
again if released, Brantley found him a medium risk of inflicting the same kind of 
violence exhibited in this case if released, and Hatzenbuehler could not even 
give a firm risk assessment, although her HCR evaluation (adapted for Draper's 
age) provided "roughly" the same opinion as Brantley's test. (Tr., vol. 2, p.2212, 
Ls.16-24.) The trial court's opinion that Draper would kill again if released into 
society is not very far removed from the two psychologists' views that Draper was 
a medium risk to reoffend. Even if the trial court had mirrored Brantley's 
conclusion that there was a "medium level of [Draper] replicating the kinds of 
violence that we see here again in the future," the court would have been well 
within its sentencing discretion to protect society from a medium level of risk that 
Draper would commit another horrendous crime of violence in the future. The 
25 Dr. Hatzenbuehler's testimony indicated that, although her written evaluation 
used the term "moderate," the term "medium" was also appropriate: 
... It's high, medium, and low or low, medium, and high. 
And so on the middle one, we can't say low, we can't say high, so it 
falls in the medium, and that was -- that was based upon sort of an 
actuarial use of the HCR instrument which, again, you have to be 
cautioned about given his age and again overlaps with what Mr. 
Brantley used for his, and so I would say that we came up with 
roughly the same opinion. 
(Tr., vol. 2, p.2212, Ls.15-24.) 
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trial court plainly understood that a medium risk of another brutal murder by 
Draper such as was inflicted on Cassie is not acceptable, and the need to protect 
society demanded Draper's confinement for life. 
Finally, even if Brantley and Hatzenbuehler had concluded that Draper 
would likely not kill again, the trial court would have been under no obligation to 
follow, or even be swayed by, such testimony -- and Draper has provided no 
authority suggesting otherwise. Cf. State v. Ramirez, 121 Idaho 319, 324, 824 
P.2d 894, 899 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Although the prosecutor or presentence 
investigator may recommend a particular sentence, such a recommendation is 
not binding upon the court and may be disregarded."). 
4. Draper Did Not Accept Full Responsibility For His Actions, Nor Did 
He Fully Cooperate With Law Enforcement 
Draper contends he deserved a lesser sentence because, "[fJrom earlyon 
in this case, [he] has accepted responsibility for his actions and cooperated with 
the police, confessing his participation and leading them ultimately to some of the 
most damaging evidence in this case." (Appellant's Brief, p.69.) Draper's 
argument is less than compelling. 
While Draper "ultimately" led law enforcement to the items buried at Black 
Rock Canyon, he did so somewhat unwittingly, after being boxed in by his latest 
in a series of lies to detectives that made it seem reasonable for him to give up 
that information at the time. What Draper may have failed to consider when he 
led officers to Black Rock Canyon was that amongst the items buried there was 
the homemade videotape containing his own chilling comments, made right after 
the crime, about how he had stabbed and killed Cassie, and saw her lifeless 
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body just disappear. (St. Ex. 94, p.i.) A chronology of Draper's evolving lies to 
law enforcement shows he was not as accepting of responsibility or cooperative 
with law enforcement as he claims. 
In his first interview (9/25/06), Draper told detectives he and Adamcik left 
the Whispering Cliffs residence at about 9:30 p.m. after visiting Matt and Cassie, 
and went to the Carmike Theatres and watched "Pulse." However, Draper was 
unable to describe that movie. (Tr., vol. 1, p.994, L.20 - p.997, LA.) During his 
second interview (9/26/06) Draper maintained his "movie" story, but was still 
unable to explain the details of "Pulse" or even say in which specific theatre they 
watched it, and made up a story about having his attention diverted from "Pulse" 
by talking to an attractive girl named "Heather." (St. Ex. 9A, 33:25 - 55:14.) After 
detectives told Draper they did not believe he had gone to the movies, Draper 
resorted to "admitting" he and Adamcik burglarized cars after they left the 
Whispering Cliffs residence -- and lied to detectives in order to conceal their 
criminality. (St. Ex. 9A, 54:35 - 1 :4:30.) When one of the detectives told Draper 
his "car-burglary" story was not working, Draper insisted it was true. (St. Ex. 9B, 
26:00 - 30:20.) After the second interview, Draper's bedroom was searched with 
Draper's consent, and a knife sheath (St. Ex. 20) was found under his bed, which 
Draper said had been brought to his house by a friend named "Andrew," who 
Draper believed had the knife that went to the sheath. (Tr., vol. 1, p.1264, LsA-
15; p.i270, L.17 - p.1271, L.25; p.1272, L.19 - p.1273. L.21.) 
Before his third interview, Draper plainly realized: (1) detectives knew he 
lied about the "movie" and "car-burglary" stories, (2) an empty sheath for one of 
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the knives had been found in his bedroom, (3) detectives knew he and Adamcik 
looked through all the rooms when they arrived at the Whispering Cliffs home (8t. 
Ex. 9A, 18:30 - 18:54), (4) detectives knew he liked horror movies, and he had 
his own idea for his own slasher movie (8t. Ex. 9A, 20:00 - 21:18, 1:17:25 -
1 :20: 15), and (5) detectives knew he had had a crush on Cassie (8t. Ex. 1 :22:30-
1 :23:30). 
With that knowledge, Draper again changed his story at the outset of his 
third interview, saying he participated with Adamcik in what he believed was 
going to be an attempt to frighten Cassie as a joke -- but to his shock and 
surprise, Adamcik actually stabbed Cassie to death. (8t. Ex. 16, 14:40:50 -
41:03, 15:04:05-32, 15:48:30 - 51:30.) Throughout the third interview, Draper 
maintained Adamcik did all the stabbing of Cassie and he (Draper) did not even 
touch her, although he also carried a knife. (8t. Ex. 16, 15:03:43 - 04:05, 
15:10:45 -11:54.) 
Having had to resort to his latest fabrication of being merely present at the 
scene during Adamcik's impromptu murder of Cassie, Draper appears to have 
forgotten that his admission to having murdered Cassie was on the homemade 
video that was one of the items buried at Black Rock Canyon, and agreed to take 
the detectives to that site. (8t. Ex. 16, 15:51 :30-48.) At his sentencing hearing, 
in an attempt to get credit for helping solve Cassie's murder, Draper said he led 
detectives to the Black Rock Canyon items even though he "knew that the tape 
would be viewed and what conclusions would arise from it," because he "wanted 
to go home for one more day to say good-bye to [his] family and [his] life before 
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the tape was viewed." (8/24/07 Tr., p.23, L.24 - p.24, L.5.) Draper's track record 
does not warrant belief in such a claim. During the murder investigation, he 
consistently exhibited a willingness to lie to suit his immediate purposes. Rather 
than trying to assist law enforcement, it is much more likely Draper either forgot 
that his comments were on the videotape or believed the videotape had been 
destroyed by his and Adamcik's attempt to burn the evidence. 
Even at the outset of his fourth interview, Draper continued to claim he 
had not stabbed Cassie. (St. Ex. 19, 12:33:17-47, 12:41:32-57.) Only later in 
that interview did Draper affirm he had stabbed Cassie four times at the urging of 
Adamcik -- to keep Adamcik from turning on him. (St. Ex. 19, 12:43:40 -
12:44:01,12:46:00-12.) At the sentencing hearing, Draper told the trial court that 
he stabbed Cassie three times -- not four. (Tr., vol. 2, p.1968, Ls.8-14.) 
For the most part and throughout each step of the investigation of 
Cassie's murder, Draper admitted only what he could not reasonably deny at any 
given moment, and fabricated new stories when caught in obvious lies. Even 
Draper's latest admissions of stabbing Cassie minimize his role when contrasted 
to the most credible piece of evidence in this case -- Draper's own videotaped 
comments: "I stabbed her in the throat. I saw her lifeless body. It just 
disappeared. Dude. I just killed Cassie. Oh, oh fuck. That felt like it wasn't 
even real. I mean it went by so fast." (St. Ex. 94, p.1.) At no time during the 
investigation, trial, or sentencing hearing did Draper accept full responsibility by 
admitting, as he did on the videotape, that he actually killed Cassie -- vis-a-vis 
suggesting he stabbed her only after her death. (See Tr., vol. 2, p.1974, LS.17-
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23 (Uln fear, I made a decision that has caused me to hate myself. I stabbed 
Cassie in the leg while Torey shown the light upon her. When I stabbed her leg, I 
immediately backed away. Cassie was quiet and still. In my mind, she was 
gone, but Torey kept yelling at me to kill her.U).) 
Draper is not the altruistic cooperator with law enforcement he makes 
himself out to be. Although he did, in fact, lead detectives to the Black Rock 
Canyon evidence, it seems clear that his doing so was a major miscalculation 
made in his eagemess to place blame entirely on Adamcik. Nor is Draper the 
acceptor of responsibility he proclaims, as he has yet to admit the same level of 
involvement in Cassie's murder that his videotaped comments reflect. Draper 
has failed to show the district court abused its sentencing discretion by not 
lessening Draper's sentence for the reasons stated. 
D. Conclusion 
The district court clearly articulated its reasons for imposing a fixed life 
sentence for first degree murder and a unified life sentence, with 30 years fixed, 
for conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The court considered the nature of 
Draper's offenses, as well as the expert testimony of Alan Brantley and Dr. 
Hatzenbuehler, Draper's age, and the likelihood Draper would reoffend (or be 
rehabilitated). Under the circumstances of this case -- the carefully planned, 
thrill-seeking murder of Cassie, the opportune victim of Draper's quest to gain 
fame by killing people -- the district court properly elevated the sentencing 
.objectives of protection of society, deterrence and punishment over the remote 
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likelihood of rehabilitation. Draper has failed to carry his burden of establishing 
that the sentencing court abused its discretion. 
VII. 
Draper Has Not Carried His Burden Of Establishing That The District Court 
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Rule 35 Motion 
Draper's final contention on appeal is that the district court erred by 
denying his Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.70-74.) A 
motion to reduce a sentence is essentially a plea for leniency; the decision on 
such a motion is within the discretion of the sentencing court. State v. Wersland, 
125 Idaho 499,873 P.2d 144 (1994). The standards for reviewing denial of such 
a motion are the same as those for evaluating whether the original sentence was 
excessive. State v. Shiloff, 125 Idaho 104, 867 P.2d 978 (1994). However, 
where the sentence originally imposed was not excessive, the defendant must 
later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented 
with the motion for reduction. If he fails to make such a showing, the denial of 
the motion will not be held to be an abuse of discretion. Shiloff, 125 Idaho at 
107,867 P.2d at 981; State v.Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct. 
App.1991). 
Draper has failed to show he was entitled to a reduction of his sentence. 
Although he presented new evidence tending to show that he was productively 
engaged in educational classes and was a good student, assisted in the "STOP" 
program by sharing with other youths how his life had taken the wrong turn, 
socialized well with other students, worked on the trash crew, and was a gifted 
musician (Appellant's Brief, pp.71-74), such information, while laudable, misses 
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the mark. The district court's comments in denying Draper's motion for leniency 
cannot be better stated: 
The Court has reviewed everything again -- including the 
new documents that you gentlemen filed . 
. . . I followed all the guidelines in sentencing Mr. Draper. 
The killing of Cassie Stoddart was not done on a whim. It 
was carefully planned -- and intentional, senseless, brutal, barbaric 
conduct. Dramatically ended her life and changed the life of Mr. 
Draper and the other boy forever -- and their families. 
Now, you're asking that the sentence be modified so that at 
some point Mr. Draper can get on with his life. You know, I think --
in my mind anyway -- he forfeited the privilege of living in our free 
society when he committed this act. 
Every time that knife went into her body, it caused, I'm sure, 
pain and fear. I mean, this was -- this was a well-thought-out 
murder. It wasn't something done on a whim. 
There is other evidence -- other documents here that were 
authored by Mr. Draper that, you know, the "Black River" article, he 
seemed to be obsessed with the Klebold fella and the other boy 
who killed all the students at Columbine High School. He seemed 
to be obsessed about that, but, you know, why he did this -- I'm not 
going to speculate. 
I'm just going on the fact that he did it, and the 
circumstances that he did it, and I think it just gets down to the fact 
that by doing this, like I said before, he forfeited his privilege of 
living in a free society the rest of his life. 
He made this decision and -- at least he can -- he is alive. 
He is alive. He is not dead like she is. I think this community and 
others have to know that if they commit crimes this terrible, there 
are going to be terrible consequences for them -- and rightly so. 
So, the motion is denied. Sentence will remain as imposed. 
(4/14/08 Tr., p.50, L.2 - p.51, L.24.) 
Draper failed to present any new information .- nor could he -- to show 
that the egregious nature of his crimes did not, by itself, justify his sentences. As 
7R 
discussed previously, a fixed life sentence is appropriate where demanded by the 
nature of the crime or because of the lack of rehabilitation potential. Eubank, 114 
Idaho at 638, 759 P.2d at 929. At the end of Draper's Rule 35 hearing, the trial 
court recounted the horrific nature of Draper's crimes, and concluded on that 
basis alone, Draper's original sentences were warranted. The Statement of 
Facts, supra, demonstrates the way Draper, along with Adamcik, planned and 
carried out Cassie's murder. Considering that evidence, despite any favorable 
new information about Draper's conduct while in confinement, Draper has failed 
to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Rule 35 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Draper's judgments of 
conviction and sentences for murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit 
murder in the first degree. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 2010. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SlXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Register #CR-06-17984-FE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
-vs-
BRlAN DRAPER, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOtION TO SuPPRESS 
Defendant. 
The Court has before it the Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Fourth Video-
taped interview of Defendant Brian Draper ("Draper") in the above-entitled matter. 
Draper originally filed a Motion to Suppress "any and all evidence and statements 
obtained by any law enforcement officers or personnel at the time of the interrogations 
and interviews conducted with Draper in this case." Defendant's Motion to Suppress, 
January 11, 2007. However, at the hearing for this matter counsel for the Defendant 
limited the scope of the Motion, moving only to suppress to the fourth video-taped 
interview ofMr. Draper, entered as State's Exhibit "E." The Court limits its decision 
accordingly. On March 9, 2007, Draper's Motion to Suppress, among other matters, came 
before the Court for the purpose of a pretrial hearing. Dave Martinez and Randall 
SchuIthies from the Bannock County Public Defender's Office appeared on behalf of the 
Defendant and Vic Pearson and Mark Hiedeman of the Bannock County Prosecutor's Office 
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appeared on behalf of the State. The Court, having heard the testimony and examined the 
proof offered by the respective parties, including the exhibits admitted at the hearing and the 
transcript of the preliminary hearing held in front of the Hon. Judge Robert Naftz on 
November 3, 2006, makes the following findings offact and conclusions oflaw. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case involves the alleged First Degree Murder and Conspiracy to Commit the 
Murder of Cassie Stoddart. The Defendants charged with these crimes, Torey Adamcik 
, 
i and Brian Draper, were at the time of the alleged crimes high school classmates of Ms. 
~\'.t; Stoddart.) The investigation of Ms. Stoddart's death led law enforcement to conduct five 
, 
separate interviews with Mr. Draper. Present at the first interview held at Draper's 
residence on September 25,2006, were Detective Andy Thomas, Detective John Ganske, 
Draper and his parents, Pamela and Kerry Draper. The interview was conducted just after 
12:00 a.m. and lasted for approximately an hour and a half. Draper was asked by the 
Detectives to give a written statement addressing the chain of events that Draper was 
engaged in on the night Ms. Stoddart died. Draper did so and the interview concluded. 
In his statement, Draper denied that either he or Adamcik were involved with Ms. 
Stoddart's death. 
Draper's second interview was conducted on September 26, 2006, at the Pocatello 
Police Department. Detectives Thomas, Ganske, Detective Sergeant Scott Marchand, 
Draper and his parents were all present for this interview. Draper was not in custody for 
interrogation purposes nor was he advised of his Miranda rights. The Detectives again 
questioned Draper regarding Draper's activities the night of the alleged murder. Draper 
I The Court granted the Defendants' motions for their cases to be tried separately and severed the case on 
January 24,2007. 
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answered the Detectives' questions, again denying that he and Adamcik had any role in 
Ms. Stoddarts' s death. Draper was free to leave after two to three hours of questioning. 
The third interview of Draper was conducted on September 27, 2006, at the 
Bannock County Sheriff s Department. The interview was recorded in a room designated 
for interviews at the Sherriff s Department, arid was admitted as State's Exhibit "C" at 
Draper's pretrial hearing. Present at that interview were Detectives Thomas and Ganske, 
Detective Alex Hamilton, Detective Sergeant Marchand, Draper and his parents. 
Detective Thomas testified at the preliminary hearing that Draper was very distraught and 
upset at this interview. Detective Thomas began the interview by reading Draper his 
{\ 
{A' \ ' Miranda rights. Prior to questioning, Draper signed a form waiving his Miranda rights. 
Over the course of the third interview, Draper changed the information he had originally 
given to the Detectives in his first and second interview and indicated that Defendant 
Adamcik had in fact stabbed Ms. Stoddart, but that Draper did not. Draper also informed 
the Detectives that after he saw Adamcik stab Ms. Stoddart Draper and Adamcik left the 
scene together, went to Adamcik's house for a brief period and then buried several items, 
including knives used to carry out Ms. Stoddart's stabbing in a location in Bannock 
County known as Black Rock. At this point in the third interview Draper was arrested 
and placed in custody. Draper was then turned over to Detective Alex Hamilton and a 
tearn of law enforcement whom accompanied Draper to Black Rock to locate the items. 
The third interview lasted approximately two and one half hours. 
Draper's fourth interview and the interview that serves as the basis for this 
Motion to Suppress was conducted on September 28, 2006, at the Bannock County 
Sheriff's Office. The interview was once again recorded, and was admitted into evidence 
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at the pretrial hearing as State's Exhibit "D." At this interview, only Detective Ganske, 
Detective Thomas and Draper were present. Draper once again changed what he 
previously related to the Detectives, this time implicating himself and Adamcik. Draper 
stated that both he and Adamcik stabbed Ms. Stoddart, instead of just Adamcik as he had 
declared in his third interview. The fourth interview lasted 25 minutes? 
At Draper's pretrial hearing, Detective Thomas, Detective Ganske, Bannock 
County Sherriff Lorin Nielsen and both Draper's mother and father all testified regarding· 
the fourth interview. Detective Ganske testified that he attempted to contact Draper's 
parents two or three times prior to the fourth interview, but to no avail. Ganske testified 
, 
that he visited the Draper residence, called Mrs. Draper's cell phone, and called the 
Draper residence land-line. Ganske stated that he did not leave a message for the 
Drapers. 
Detective Thomas testified that either he or Detective Ganske verbally told 
. . 
Draper before the fourth interview began that he had a right to have his parents present 
Thomas testified that before questioning began the detectives mirandized Draper and 
Draper signed a form waiving his Miranda rights. This form was admitted as State's 
Exhibit "E" at the pretrial hearing. Although Thomas stated that the form does not 
instruct Draper that he had a right to have his parents present at the interview, Thomas 
testified that either he or Detective Ganske instructed Draper that Draper was under no 
obligation to talk to the Detectives without his parents or an attorney present. Thomas 
stated that Draper did not request that his parents or an attorney be present for the 
interview and Draper answered the Detectives' questions. Thomas testified at the 
2 Because the Court does not deem the Fifth interview of Draper to be relevant for purposes of this Motion, 
the Court does address it 
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preliminary hearing that Draper was less emotional at the fourth interview than he was at 
the third interview, and that he had no trouble communicating with Draper at the fourth 
interview. At the pretrial hearing, Thomas stated that Draper was in fact "articulate" at 
the fourth interview. "When asked how the interview ended, Thomas testified that Draper 
had requested that his parents be present. At that time the Detectives stopped questioning 
Draper. Thomas further stated that there was no indication that Pamela or Kerry Draper 
intended to retain counsel on behalf of their son. 
Bannock County Sherriff Lorin Nielsen also testified at Draper's pretrial hearing. 
Sherriff Nielsen's testimony was directed at what happened after Draper's third 
o...,~ interview. Nielsen testified that he met Draper's parents after the third interview and 
>; 
explained "the process" to his parents, i.e., -- that Draper was under arrest, that there 
would be a preliminary hearing, and the Magistrate Court would appoint an attorney. 
Nielsen testified that he did not remember whether or not the Drapers indicated that they 
were going to retain counsel in this. matter. 
Draper's parents, Pamela and Kerry Draper, also testified. Mrs. Draper stated that 
she had indicated to Sherriff Nielsen that she and her husband were going tohire an 
attorney to represent Draper, and that after the third interview Nielsen had told the 
Drapers to hire an attorney. Draper's father testified that he asked Nielsen if Nielsen had 
a recommendation for a good local attorney, but that Nielsen stated he did not. Mrs. 
Draper testified that on the morning of the fourth interview, she had not been contacted 
by Detectives Thomas or Ganske. Mrs. Draper did state that she received a call on her 
cell phone that morning, but she did not recognize the number and did not answer. Mrs. 
Draper testified that at the time she received the call, she and her husband were speaking 
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to an attorney in an attempt to seek legal representation for their son. Mrs. Draper also 
testified that Draper suffers from anxiety and has a Dominant Ear that affects the way 
that Draper thinks. 
After viewing and/or reading the evidence submitted and the testimony offered 
both at Draper's pretrial hearing, as well as the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the 
Court makes the following findings of essential facts which it deems established by the 
evidence. 3 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
1. Draper was 16 years of age at the time of the fourth interview with law 
enforcement. 
2. At the time of the fourth interview, Draper had completed his sophomore year of 
high school and was enrolled as a junior at Pocatello High School. 
3. Draper had no prior experience with law enforcement prior to his first interview 
with Detectives Ganske and Thomas on September 25,2006. 
4. Draper's parents were present for Draper's first, second, and third interview, but 
were not present for Draper's fourth interview. 
5. Draper's prior experience with law enforcement includes only his first, second, 
and third interview, all occurring within the three days prior to the fourth 
interview. Draper was read his Miranda rights and signed a Miranda waiver form 
at the third interview. 
3 The Court has viewed the recorded video of Draper's fourth interview. The Court notes that the audio 
quality of the recording is, in parts, scanty at best. However, the Court was able to ascertain Draper's 
demeanor, disposition, and capability of responding to the Detectives' questioning. 
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6. Following the third interview, Draper's parents and Sherriff Nielsen engaged in a 
conversation regarding legal representation for Draper, but the Drapers did not 
assert the right to counsel on behalf of their son. 
7. There is no evidence, one way or the other, indicating that Draper was deprived of 
food or sleep prior to the fourth interview. 
8. It is not the Bannock County Jail's practice to deprive an inmate of food or sleep. 
9. Draper suffers from anxiety and has a dominant ear that affects the way he thinks. 
10. At the time of the fourth interview, Draper was still under arrest from the previous 
day, and was not free to leave. 
11. The fonn that the Sherriff s office uses for juveniles to waive Miranda rights does 
not indicate that the juvenile defendant has a right to have his or her parents 
present at the interview. 
12. Draper was verbally instructed that he had a right to have his parents present at 
the fourth interview. 
13. Draper was mirandized before questioning at the fourth interview commenced. 
14. Draper signed a form waiving his Miranda rights before the questioning started. 
15. Draper did not invoke his right to have counsel present 
16. Draper did not appear tired, ineffectual or vulnerable during the interview. 
17. Draper had a noticeable stutter during the fourth interview. 
18. Draper is able to articulately express himself, both in verbal and written fonn to 
the extent that is expected of an average 16 year old high school sophomore. 
19. The fourth ihterview concluded because Draper requested the presence of his 
parents. 
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ANALYSIS AND RULINGS 
The determination of whether a juvenile has voluntarily waived his Miranda 
rights requires an inquiry into the totality of all circumstances surrounding the 
interrogation, including "the juvenile's age, experience,education, background, and 
intelligence, and into whether he had the capacity to understand the warnings given him, 
the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights." 
Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); State v. 
Doe, 130 Idaho at 811, 817 948 P.2d 167, 172 (1997) (hereafter, "Doe I"). The state be2x' 
the burden of demonstrating that an individual has voluntarily, intelligently and 
rl knowingly waived his rights by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Alger, 115 
,')j 
~ Idaho 42, 46, 764 P.2d 119, 123 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The trial court in State v. Doe, 131 Idaho 709,963 P.2d 392 (1998) (hereafter, 
"Doe II") identified and considered the following 'factnal circumstances as relevant to tte 
detenrination of the validity of the juvenile Doe's Miranda waiver: (1) Doe could only 
read and write at a fourth grade level but had an eighth grade education; (2) the court's 
observation that Doe demonstrated a lack of sophistication and a low level of 
intelligence; (3) the officer involved in Doe's interview never told Doe that he would be 
arrested if he refused to speak with him; and (4) the officer's testimony that Doe was 
informed of his rights and said that he understood them before signing a waiver and 
agreeing to speak with the officer. Id. at 713. In addition, the court noted that neither 
Doe's ADD diagnosis nor his placement on medication to relieve the symptoms of ADD 
were material. Id. This determination was premised on Doe's testimony that ADD had 
little effect on him ,and that he had voluntarily stopped taking his medication years 
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before, with few consequences. Id. The trial court also considered the written 
acknowledgment of Miranda rights and waiver form signed by Doe and Doe's testimony 
at the hearing that he could both read and understand the words on the form. Id. For 
these reasons, the trial court determined that Doe executed a knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent waiver of his rights. Id. 
On appeal in Doe II, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that in evaluating the 
voluntariness of a juvenile's confession, consideratiori must be given to "the child's age, 
maturity, intelligence, education, experience with police and access to a parent or other 
supportive adult" Id., Citing, DoeI, 130 Idaho at 817, 948 P .2d at 172. Some additional 
factors in the voluntariness determination include whether Miranda warnings were given, 
the length of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and 
deprivation offood or sleep. State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211, 214, 858 P.2d 750, 753 
(1993). In Doe II, the defendant was just a few months away from his eighteenth 
birthday at the time of questioning. The Supreme Court found he was given his Miranda 
warnings and not subjected to extensive questioning or a lengthy detention. In addition, 
the court found that although Doe's father was not present during the interview, Doe was 
not precluded from having his father present by the officer involved in the questioning. 
Id. Thus, the court held, Doe's waiver of his Miranda rights was given knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily. Jd. 
An express written waiver of Miranda rights is strong proof of a voluntary waiver 
but is not conclusive proof. State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 52350 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002). 
(hereafter, "Doe III"). In Doe III, the detective who conducted the interview with the 
juvenile downplayed the importance of the Miranda warnings, stating that before he can 
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speak with Doe, Doe needed to "read ... this little piece of paper" (referring to the written 
Miranda rights). ld. The Detective also told Doe, "You're going to have to answer some 
questions. Because we're going to have to ask you a few things about what happened, 
what was there, okay? If you want to talk to me, I just need to have you sign right there." 
ld. at 524. Doe replied "okay" and signed the waiver form. ld. The questioning then 
began. ld. The cowi found that even though the detective did state that the Miranda 
warnings are just a "little sheet of paper," and "You're going to have to answer some 
questions," the detective carefully recited the warnings to Doe, and Doe made it clear that 
he knew what the warrilngs were, and that they have been read tol:;tim before. ld. The 
court determined that while Doe was young, at age 12, he knew what the Miranda rights 
were and understood what they meant. ld. 
The situation with Draper is more straightforward than Doe II and Doe III. The 
State concedes that Draper was in custody for purposes of the fowih interview. At his 
third interview the previous day Draper was mirandized, signed a waiver form, arrested 
and spent the night at the Bannock County Jail. As the State acknowledges, for the fowih 
interview, the detectives were was required to apprise Draper of his Fifth Amendment 
rights again, which tl;le Detectives testified they did. However, Draper argues that 
aJthough his Miranda wamings were given to him again, his waiver of these rights was 
not voluntary. Draper argues that due to his age, experience, lack of sleep, the fact that 
his parents were not present at the interview, the stress and fatigue Draper endured the 
week of the fourth interview, and his dominant ear and anxiety conditions, he could not 
have knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. 
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At the onset of the interview, Detectives Thomas and Ganske give Draper a 
waiver form and read Draper his Miranda rights. The rights were read slowly and 
nothing about how the Detectives made Draper aware of his rights appeared to be rushed 
or pressured. Detective Thomas also testified that either he or Detective Ganske verb3.1\y 
told Draper that he had a right to have his parents present for the interview and was under 
no obligation to answer a question without his parents or an attorney present. Draper 
indicated that he understood this and signed the waiver form. Unlike the situation in Doe 
III, there is no indication that the Detectives downplayed the importance of Draper's 
rights, or told Draper that he was "going to have to answer some questions." 
The Court stresses that Draper's age is a critical factor in the Court's analysis and 
the Court is mindful of the role that Draper's youth played in his interview. The Court 
also deems the absence of Draper's parents at the fourth interview, when Draper's 
parents were present at the three previous interviews to be significant. Draper may have 
been accustomed to relying on his parents to interrupt the Detectives' questioning in the 
previous if they deemed it necessary, yet he was not afforded this support at the fourth 
interview. 4 However, the absence of Draper's parents is not dispositive. Draper was 
informed he had a right to have his parents at the interview and even if the he was not so 
informed, this fact is not enough to suppress the confession if other factors indicate that 
the confession was voluntary. Moreover, both Detective Thomas and Detective Ganske 
testified that once Draper requested to have his parents present at the interview, the 
Detectives refrained from questioning Draper further and concluded the interview. 
4 The Court notes that there was significant testimony at Draper's pretrial hearing regarding Detective 
Ganske's attempts at contacting Draper's parents before the fourth interview. However, the Court deems 
such attempts to be insignificant because in the end, Draper is a juvenile, his parents were not present and 
the interview went forward anyway. 
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Moreover, the Court devotes some significance to the fact that at the third 
interview, Draper was read his Miranda rights, signed a Miranda waiver form and 
engaged in an interview, all while in the presence of his parents. While this may not 
indicate that Draper has a generalized experience in dealing with law enforcement, it does 
signifY that Draper was at the very least subjected to the process. This is suggestive of 
two things. First, it reveals that Draper was at least familiar with the procedure of being . 
mirandized prior to the fourth interview. Second, it suggests that had Draper's parents 
been at the fourth interview, Draper may have waived his Miranda rights anyway, as he 
did at the third interview. Of course, the Court does not presume such suggestions as 
true, but because this Motion involves a totality of the circumstances test, the Court takes 
all the circumstances of the interview into account, including the circumstances of 
Draper's third interview. Although Draper argues that the first, second and third 
interviews should not be considered in determining whether Draper has prior experience 
with law enforcement because they occurred in the three days prior to the fourth 
interview, the Court finds that the interviews, and especially the third interview, at least 
familiarized Draper with the practice and administration oflaw enforcement in the 
interview setting. 
Although Draper was slightly younger than the defendant in Doe II the time of 
their confessions, Draper's maturity, intelligence, and education appear to be at a higher 
level than the Defendant in Doe II. Draper does not suffer from ADD, and has a reading 
and intelligence level that is higher than the defendant in Doe II. Although Pamela 
Draper testified that Draper suffers from anxiety and a dominant ear that affects the way 
Draper thinks, the Court does not deem these conditions to be more inhibiting than the 
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conditions and mental capacity of the defendant in Doe II. The Court has reviewed the 
written statement that Draper provided Detectives Thomas and Ganske the night of 
Draper's first interview, September 26, 2006. The statement is articulate, entirely 
coherent, and lacks any indication that would tend to show Draper is deficient in the 
intellect or erudition expected of a 16-year old junior in high school. 
Another issue that Draper raised at the pretrial hearing is deprivation of food or 
sleep. Although the State bears the burden of demQ):lstrating that Draper knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights, there was no evidence presented at the 
nil,. hearing regarding this issue. However, the Court notes that the interview occurred at 
'!J 
11 :30 a.m. and that Draper appeared alert and capable of responding to any questions that 
were asked of him. The Court also identified when watching the recorded interview that 
Draper did appear to be nervous and did stutter at certain points during the interview, but 
there is nothing to indicate drowsiness, fatigue or anxiousness affected his responses to 
the questioning. Moreover, the Court also notes that Draper stayed at the jail the night 
preceding the interview and as a practical matter, it is not the jail's practice· to deprive 
their inmates of food or sleep. 
Draper also addressed the issue of the length of his detention at the pretrial 
hearing. Draper argues that by the time the fourth interview was conducted, Draper had 
been under questioning for seven hours. This amount of time spent in questioning, 
Draper asserts, pressured him into answering questions that he may not have answered 
had he fully understood his rights. However, the Court frods that although the series of 
interviews with Draper and his parents undoubtedly caused a certain amount of stress, 
the interviews were stretched over the course of three days, one and a half hours for the 
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first interview, two to three hours for the second interview, two and one half hours for 
the third interview, and half an hour for the fourth. Draper was not questioned for seven 
consecutive hours at the time the fourth interview began. Further, the fourth interview 
lasted only 25-30 minutes. Therefore, the length of detention for the interview in 
question would not have caused Draper to forfeit his will to vulnerability or fatigue. 
Finally, the Court addresses whether Draper's parents invoked the right to counsel 
on Draper's behalf. Mrs. Draper testified that she had conversations with Sherriff 
Nielsen following Draper's third interview regarding retention of counsel for Draper. 
a., Draper's father conoborated this in his testimony, indicating that he asked Sherriff 
, Q 
II \J 
!.~ Nielsen whether the Sherriff thought Keith Zollinger, a local attorney, would be a good 
attorney for the Drapers. Sherriff Nielsen was unable to recall whether that conversation 
took place. The Court will assume, for these purposes, that the Drapers did discuss the 
possibility of retaining an attorney with Sheriff Nielsen. However, the mere possibility 
or suggestion that counsel might be retained does not constitute an invocation of the 
right to counsel on behalf of their son. The Court is attentive to the fact that there is a 
fine line between the magic words of "I want my attorney" and "I am thinking about 
getting an attorney." Nonetheless, the distinction is an important one, as addressed by 
the United States Supreme COUli in Davis v. U.S. 512 U.S. 452,114 S.Ct. 2350 (1994). 
See also, State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,26 P.3d 31 (2001). Ultimately, the Drapers' 
inquiry as to retention of counsel does not constitute an invocation of their son's right to 
counsel. 
Upon the foregoing analysis, the Court makes the following conclusions oflaw. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L It is the State's burden to show that Draper knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 
waived his Miranda lights. 
2. Draper's age, education, expelience, all support a finding that Draper was sllfficiently 
mature and capable to engage in the interview without the presence of his parents, while 
also understanding that he was not obligated to answer any questions without his 
parents or counsel there. 
3. While the evidence supports a fmding that Draper's parents intended to retain counsel 
in this matter, neither parent invoked the right to counsel on behalf of Draper before the 
fourth interview began. 
4. Draper was under arrest and in custody for purposes of his Fifth Amendment rights 
during the fourth interview. 
5. The length of Draper's detention and questioning plior to the fourth interview did not 
it-iliibit Draper from articulating his responses to the Detectives' questioning. 
6. Despite tllere being no evidence from the State regarding deprivation of food or sleep, 
the Court finds that because it is not the Jail's practice to divest their inmates of food or 
sleep, there is no reason to believe that Draper was so deprived. 
7. Detectives Ganske and Thomas read Draper his Miranda rights and did not downplay 
the significance of those rights. 
8. Draper volillltatily signed a form waiving his Miranda rights, and such act is strong 
evidence that Draper illlderstood his rights and the consequences of waiving them. 
9. There was an absence of any coercive conduct by Detectives Ganske and Thomas. 
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10. The evidence, with patiicular attention to the Court's observation of Draper's 
demeanor during the interview and Detective Thomas's testimony, support a finding 
that Draper's anxiety or dominant ear conditions did not overcome his ability to 
communicate and articulate responses to the Detectives' questions. 
11. Draper did not invoke his right to have counsel present at the fourth interview. 
12. Based upon a review ofthe totality of the circumstances, taking into account Draper's 
age, experience, education, the absence of his parents or a friendly adult at the interview 
and any additional circumstances such as length of detention or deprivation offood or 
sleep, the Court finds Draper had the capacity to understand the warnings given him, 
the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those 
rights. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress the Fourth Video-taped Interview, filed in the above-entitled matter, shall be 
DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this J ~ay of March, 2007. 
• 
c:212>D.~ 
Peter McDermott 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the !j; day of March, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in ;he 
manner indicated. 
Bannpck County Prosecutor 
Bannock County Public Defender 
-#-
DATED this ~ day of March, 2007, 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
(t.}Ha:nd Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Overnight Delivery / ' i 
(t-}fI8nd Deliver~ ~~f.t?,)j. ." ·,Y 
( ) Facsimile 
~~ ~~ •..... D I k 
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